FBIS DAILY REPORT

MIDDLE EAST & SOUTH ASIA REVIEW

29 MAY 1987

Iran

UK Diplomat Kidnapping — Edward Chaplin, first secretary of the British interests section at the Swedish Embassy, was kidnapped in Tehran, London Press Association reported. He was driving his own car on an urban street when another vehicle forced him to stop and a group of armed men seized him. The British Foreign Office summoned the Iranian charge d'affaires, while British diplomats in Tehran were trying to arrange a meeting with senior Iranian officials. According to AFP, the FRG ambassador to Iran witnessed the kidnapping and believes the abductors are members of an Islamic revolutionary committee. Sources in Tehran cited by the agency speculated that the kidnapping could be linked to a shoplifting case against an Iranian diplomat in Manchester. While neither Tehran radio nor IRNA has yet been observed to refer to the kidnapping, a 29 May IRNA report noted that Iran has "strongly" protested the "illegal arrest" 2 weeks ago of an Iranian diplomat in Manchester, and the British Government has not presented any "justification" for the incident.

Khamene'i on Reagan Remarks — "Be careful and do not disgrace the American nation with your foolish policies," President 'Ali Khamene'i told President Reagan in an 'Id al-Fitr sermon reported by Tehran radio. Khamene'i said Reagan had described Iran as "an uncivilized nation" but said he did not want to "retaliate" and "insult the American nation." The U.S. Administration wants to show its strength after suffering "consecutive insults" in the Gulf, he asserted. Let the world and Reagan know that Iran is determined to defend itself and will inflict blows "wherever it deems necessary," he warned. Later, in a meeting with the visiting Cuban foreign minister reported by IRNA, Khamene'i expressed confidence that the United States would retreat "with humiliation and disgrace" from the hostile position it has taken.

Turkish Press Row — It is "out of the question" for Turkey to beg Iran's pardon for a magazine article about Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni, the Turkish foreign minister said in remarks cited by *Anatolia*. He added that the Turkish authorities had nothing to do with the publication about which Iran had lodged an official complaint. In continuing developments, the Turkish Foreign Ministry summoned the Iranian ambassador after an Iranian daily published an "ugly" article about Ataturk, according to *Anatolia*.

Israel

Interception of Lebanese Plane — A Lebanese Air Force training aircraft was intercepted by Israeli warplanes 28 May and forced to land in Israel, Beirut radio reported. The interception occurred when the Lebanese Fouga Magister arrived over the Mediterranean west of Sidon in response to a distress signal from a boat that was in danger of sinking. The plane was prevented from carrying out its rescue mission, but the Israeli authorities subsequently allowed it to return to Halat air base, the radio noted. The IDF spokesman acknowledged the incident in a statement cited by IDF radio, indicating that the Fouga was intercepted because it had been detected flying on a north-south path toward the Israeli border.

Pollard Affair — At a Labor Party meeting reported by Jerusalem radio, Foreign Minister Shim'on Peres and Defense Minister Yitzhaq Rabin sharply criticized MK Abba Eban for his handling of the investigation into the Pollard affair. Eban declared that he will not submit to party pressure on the issue, but an "incensed" Peres "blasted" Eban for conducting a "melodramatic" appeal.

Nafsu Case — The attorney general has authorized a police investigation into charges that Shin Bet personnel gave false evidence to the military court that tried Lieutenant 'Izzat Nafsu, Jerusalem radio reported.

Libya

Al-Qadhdhafi Remarks — In a lecture to university students broadcast by Tripoli television 27 May, Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi acknowledged the success of "anti-Arab Western colonialist propaganda" in Chad and other parts of Africa. Such propaganda has persuaded Chadians to hate Libyans and regard them as colonialists, he said, while Chadians do not hate the "real" colonialists from Europe and the United States. Al-Qadhdhafi also said Western talk about Libya possessing missiles that can reach southern Europe indicates the desire of "imperialist powers" to occupy the southern Mediterranean coastline. He stressed that claims about the range of Libyan missiles are exaggerated, adding that while a Libyan missile may cover 100 km, "they say that it can travel over a distance of 1,000 km" in order to "magnify the ugly picture" of Libya depicted in the West.

Relations With USSR — Libyan and Soviet officials signed the minutes of a bilateral agreement on technical, economic, and scientific cooperation 28 May, Tripoli radio reported, noting that visiting Soviet official Konstantin Katushev signed for the USSR. In Moscow, TASS disclosed that a Soviet naval squadron will visit Tripoli 2-5 June.

Maghreb

Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba on the occasion of the 1 June victory day pardoned 13 people recently convicted of belonging to the illegal Tunisian Socialist Federation and 198 others, TAP announced.

In Morocco a royal pardon on the occasion of 'Id al-Fitr released 422 prisoners and lightened the sentences of more than 100 others, Rabat radio reported.

Afghanistan

The Revolutionary Council will shortly publish a decree that fixes the limit of land ownership in the DRA at 50 acres of first class land or its equivalent, PDPA General Secretary Najibullah disclosed in an 'Id al-Fitr speech carried by Kabul radio. Peasants will be allowed to keep land they received in the post-1978 land reform, though they will not be able to sell or otherwise dispose of land received from the state.

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'Arafat, Soviet Envoy Set Date for Qaddumi Visit

JN281149 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1135 GMT 28 May 87

[Text]Tunis, 28 May (INA)— PLO Chairman Yasir 'Arafat has received a message from the Soviet leadership described as important. It was conveyed by Mikhail Sytenko, an envoy of the Soviet leadership, at a meeting here last night with Yasir 'Arafat. Palestinian sources said the message dealt with the latest Arab and international developments affecting the Palestinian question.

'Arafat asked the Soviet envoy to convey a message to his country's leaders on the results of the 18th PNC session held in Algiers last month. The two men agreed during the meeting that a Palestinian delegation under Faruq Qaddumi, head of the PLO's Political Department, will visit Moscow in mid-June.

PNSF National Unity Program Presented

JN281022 Al-Shariqah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 25 May 87 p 16

[All program numbering as published]

[Text] Damascus — At a meeting to be held in Damascus today, the PNSF will discuss a draft political program it will submit to the PLO factions to complete their unity. *Al-Khalij* has learned that the PNSF had earlier tasked 'Abd al-Muhsin Abu Mayzar, former PLO Executive Committee member, to formulate this draft program. *Al-Khalij* obtained the text of the draft program from one of the factions in the PNSF. The draft program includes a general introduction, which concludes that "after studying and reviewing the PLO's past course and experience, the PNSF proposes this draft program to achieve comprehensive Palestinian national unity on the basis of abiding by the National Charter, the program of national consensus in both its political and organizational aspects, the Tripoli document, and PNC resolutions."

The draft program defines the PNSF's positions as follows:

First: The formation of the 17th PNC

First: In accordance with the PLO's basic statutes; to end the dispute, differences, and controversy over all measures over the past 4 years; and to achieve national unity on the basis of the National Charter, PNC resolutions, and the Tripoli document, we call for the convention of a new PNC, the 17th PNC, in which all the national Palestinian factions, forces, and figures will participate to secure achievement of the required comprehensive unity within the framework of the PLO. Members of the new PNC will be selected from national factions and figures and the representatives of popular organizations through a comprehensive national dialogue while taking into consideration the organizational relationship of the popular organizations' representatives.

Second: The commitment to the Palestinian people's inalienable rights and the rejection of any bargaining over these rights, particularly their right to repatriation, self-determination, and establishment of an independent state on the national soil of Palestine with Jerusalem as its capital, and firm loyalty to the PLO's political and organizational program.

Third: Insistence on the PLO as the sole and legitimate representative of our Palestinian people in and outside the occupied homeland and on the PLO's independence on the basis of a commitment to its charter and its national consensus program which embodies our people's inalienable rights and the rejection of procuration, deputization, and sharing of representation given that this will constitute trusteeship, containment, and replacement, will harm its independence, and will interfere in its domestic affairs.

Fourth: The continuation of struggle in all its forms, particularly armed, political, and popular struggle to attain our people's objectives and inalienable rights, to liberate all Palestinian and Arab territories from Israeli occupation, and to confront the imperialist-Zionist alliance's hostile schemes against the Arab region, particularly the objectives and schemes of Camp David and the U.S.-Israeli strategic alliance, as a genuine expression of the nature of our people's national liberation movement which is hostile to imperialism, Zionism, and colonialism.

Fifth: Reaffirming the rejection of UN Security Council Resolution 242 and its rejection as a basis for settling the Palestinian cause, for it disavows our people's existence and their national, inalienable rights, including their right to repatriation, self-determination, sovereignty, and national independence, and because it also tackles the cause as one of refugees without any mention of their rights which were acknowledged by international legitimacy and UN resolutions.

Sixth: Reaffirming the rejection of all agreements with any party or country which harm our people's right to repatriation, self-determination, and the establishment of an independent state, as well as their right to independent representation through the PLO, the Palestinian people's sole and legitimate representative.

Seventh: The rejection of and opposition to all solutions and plans seeking to liquidate the Arab cause, whose core is the Palestinian cause, at the expense of national Palestinian and Arab rights, particularly the Camp David accords, the Egyptian-Israeli [peace] treaty, the Reagan plan, and autonomy rule.

Eighth: Affirmation of the need to achieve and reinforce the unity of national, social, trade union, and popular institutions and to work to establish a national front inside the occupied homeland under the PLO. The exposure and condemnation of all attempts to find substitutes for the PLO. The reinforcement of our people's struggle and steadfastness and providing them with the prerequisites to resist occupation, the Israeli iron-fist policy, and the autonomy and distribution of functions schemes, to halt and confront expulsion and settlement policies and institutionalized Zionist terrorism, and to defend our people's causes, rights, national identity, heritage and history, holy places, and their future and present.

Ninth: Affirmation of the need to mobilize our people's capabilities both inside and outside the occupied homeland and to reinforce their rallying around the PLO and the national consen-

sus program which embodies our people's right to repatriation, to self-determination, to an independent state, and to independent representation.

Tenth: Affirmation of rejection and condemnation of joint discussions with Israeli figures and forces which believe in and practice Zionist ideology and disavow our inalienable national rights in Palestine in accordance with the resolutions of the 13th PNC session on 13 March 1977.

On the Arab level: PLO Constants in Arab Relations [subhead]

1. Reinforcement of cohesion between the Palestinian revolution and the Arab liberation movement since the former is an indivisible part of the latter on the level of the Arab homeland as a whole. This is to effectively confront imperialist and Zionist conspiracies and capitulationist schemes, foremost of which are the Camp David agreements and policy, the Reagan plan, the autonomy plan, the distribution of functions plan, and all other solutions aimed at entrenching the occupation of Arab territories and liquidating the Arab-Zionist conflict within the framework of U.S.-Israeli interests.

2. PLO relations with Arab countries shall be based on commitment to the following principles:

a. Commitment to support for the issues of Arab struggle, foremost of which is the Palestine question.

b. Commitment and adherence to the Palestinian people's national rights, including their right to repatriation, to self-determination, to an independent state, and to independent representation under the PLO without procuration, deputization, or sharing of representation.

c. Affirmation of the special and distinguished relations with the peoples of the Arab confrontation states — Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt.

d. Adherence to resolutions adopted by Arab consensus regarding the Palestine question. Affirmation that the Fes summit resolutions be regarded as the minimum level of political moves by the Arab countries which should be integrated with all the requirements of military action to rectify the balance of power in favor of achieving Palestinian and Arab rights, and rejection of any interpretation of these resolutions which may infringe or encroach on the right to repatriation, to self-determination, to an independent state, or to independent representation.

e. PLO relations with Arab countries shall be based on mutual respect and noninterference in internal affairs.

Jordan [subhead]

1. Affirmation of the special and distinguished relations between the fraternal Palestinian and Jordanian peoples and of the need to develop these relations to benefit the true interests of both peoples and the Arab confrontation states. This relationship necessarily dictates that the PLO be allowed to shoulder its responsibilities in Jordan toward the Palestinian people, reinforce the national independence of both peoples and their confrontation of the Zionist-Israeli ambitions of expansion at the expense of Palestinian and Jordanian territory, and enable the Palestinian people to regain their national rights, including their right to repatriation, to self-determination, to independent representation, and to an independent state.

2. Adherence to PNC resolutions on relations with Jordan on the basis that the PLO is the sole, legitimate representative both inside and outside the occupied land as affirmed by the Rabat summit resolution in 1974.

3. Commitment to the 15th PNC session principles and resolutions regarding the Baghdad summit resolutions on bolstering steadfastness and the work of the Palestinian-Jordanian joint committee.

Lebanon [subhead]

1. The reaffirmation of the special and unique relations between the Palestinian and Lebanese people on the basis of the rejection of resettlement and the plans for an alternative homeland and of our people's right to work for their national cause.

2. The enhancement of relations with the fraternal Lebanese people and their national forces and the participation in their heroic struggle to resist and end the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon in accordance with the plan that is adopted by the Lebanese national forces.

3. The reaffirmation of Lebanon's unity, Arab affiliation, independence, and sovereignty.

4. The enhancement of the militant alliance among the Lebanese-Palestinian-Syrian triangle of steadfastness.

5. Support for national efforts to settle the Lebanese domestic crisis with the assistance of fraternal Syria for the sake of a democratic, united, and independent Arab Lebanon.

6. Cooperation with the Lebanese Government, the national forces, and fraternal Syria to regulate the state of affairs in our camps in Lebanon, defend them, and consolidate the unity of our masses in the camps in support of the Palestinian revolution on the basis of abidance by the national charter and PNC resolutions, commitment to our people's right to residence, work, education, health, and freedom to engage in political and social activities, and rejection of settlement and expulsion attempts, as well as the enhancement of Palestinian-Lebanese fraternal bonds.

7. The affirmation of our people's right to defend and protect themselves within the framework of commitment to the national and pan-Arab efforts and their requirements in a manner that guarantees the solution of all conflicts that have existed or may exist. The affirmation that the security of the camps is an integral part of Lebanese national security. Work with the Lebanese Government and the Lebanese national forces, in cooperation with sisterly Syria, to remove all conflicts and solve the problems that emerged before the second camps war. This will be done by guaranteeing the security of the camps and their periphery and reuniting the comrades of the common trench of struggle in a

manner that enhances the militant Lebanese-Syrian-Palestinian cohesion against the Zionist enemy pursuant to agreements on this subject.

Egypt [subhead]

Out of faith in and in consolidation of the distinctive and special relations between the Palestinian and Egyptian peoples:

1. Affirmation of the common pan-Arab struggle between the fraternal Palestinian and Egyptian peoples and promotion of militant bonds between the PLO and the Egyptian national forces. This will permit them to bolster their struggle against the Camp David policy and accords which harm Egyptian and pan-Arab sovereignty so that Egypt can get rid of its shackles and regain its pioneering role in the march of Arab struggle against imperialism and Zionism.

2. Severance of political relations with the ruling regime in Egypt as long as this regime is committed to the Camp David accords and the Egyptian-Israeli treaty and its appendices.

3. Declaration of the invalidity of the Zionist enemy's right to demarcate the Palestinian borders with Egypt, including the Tabah arbitration agreement, because the Palestinian people are the legal owners of the Palestinian lands and the ones authorized to demarcate borders between Palestine and Egypt.

4. Demanding that the Egyptian Government stop its violation of the Palestinian and Arab national rights with its adherence to the Egyptian-Israeli treaty.

Syria [subhead]

Proceeding from the special and distinctive relations between the Palestinian and Syrian peoples:

1. Abidance by the resolutions of the successive PNC sessions which stress the importance of the strategic relationship between the PLO and Syria in the service of the common national and pan-Arab militant objectives and in confrontation of the Zionist-imperialist enemy and its conspiratorial schemes in the region.

2. Affirmation of the unity of struggle, cause, treatment, and solution vis-a-vis the Arab-Zionist conflict in a manner that guarantees the liberation of the occupied Arab and Palestinian territory and the Palestinian people's attainment of their national inalienable rights to repatriation, self-determination, and independent state, and independent representation.

3. Enhancement of the Syrian-Palestinian militant alliance and promotion of brotherly relations and alliance between the PLO and Syria in order to escalate their joint struggle against the imperialist and Zionist schemes, the capitulatory solutions, and the attempts to publicize the Camp David policy.

The Front of Steadfastness and Confrontation, Arab Solidarity, and the Participating Arab Front [subhead]

1. Working to bolster the military alliance among the parties of the pan-Arab Front of Steadfastness and Confrontation on the basis of confronting imperialist and Zionist threats and schemes to liquidate the Arab-Zionist conflict within the framework of U.S.-Israeli interests and at the expense of Palestinian and Arab rights.

2. Working to bolster Arab solidarity on the basis of hostility to imperialism and Zionism and reactivate the Arab summits for this purpose; supporting the Palestinian Arab people's struggle to regain their inalienable national rights; deepening the ties of solidarity and unity among the Arab countries; and commitment to the charters and treaties of joint Arab action — politically, militarily, economically, culturally, and socially — on the basis of pooling the resources to liberate the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories and confront the Zionist aggression and the hostile U.S. schemes against our Arab region.

3. Bolstering the alliance with the Arab forces of the liberation movement on the basis of joint action to achieve the objectives of pan-Arab struggle and joint action against imperialism, Zionism, and their schemes and designs in the Arab region. There must be work to reconstitute the Arab front participating in the Palestinian revolution in coordination with the Arab people's congress so that it may play its pan-Arab role on all levels to support, protect, and maintain the Palestinian revolution as part of the commitment to the pan-Arab charter and the program of national consensus.

The Iraq-Iran War [subhead]

1. Affirmation of the need for an immediate halt to this war, for withdrawal to the internationally recognized borders, for a comprehensive exchange of POW's, and for the initiation of negotiations to solve the dispute by peaceful means.

2. Ending the Iraq-Iran war, which was imposed on the two neighbors and has exhausted their resources, is bound to make a great contribution to stability, reduction of tension in the Middle East, and consolidation of the front of forces hostile to imperialism and Zionism in the region.

3. Stressing the implementation of the principles and provisions of international law on respect for sovereignty and regional security, noninterference in internal affairs, and the inadmissibility of seizing others' territories by force.

4. Working to end the war in accordance with the aforementioned bases.

Condemnation of Terrorism [subhead]

1. Condemnation of terrorism as well as international terrorism, headed by the state and systematic U.S.-Israeli terrorism, against the Palestinian Arab people as well as against the Syrian, Lebanese, Libyan, and other Arab peoples and all Arab liberation movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

2. Affirmation of adherence to the principles of the UN Charter and to UN resolutions stressing the Palestinian people's inalienable national rights and the need to enable the Palestinian people to exercise these rights as an indispensable condition for the establishment of a just peace in the Middle East. The UN

resolutions also stressed that all peoples under occupation have the right to pursue all forms of struggle for liberation and independence.

3. Supporting the initiative of the Syrian Arab Republic to hold an international conference under UN auspices to define terrorism and to distinguish it from the peoples' legitimate liberation struggle as well as reach international agreements and take the appropriate measures to prevent and end acts of international terrorism.

On the International Level [subhead]

1. The PLO is an indivisible part of the Arab and world liberation movements. The PLO is eager to consolidate ties of cooperation and alliance with the socialist states, headed by the USSR, and also with the PRC.

2. Strong cooperation with the Islamic countries, the ICO, the nonaligned states, the African states, and the OAU and activating the PLO's work in these countries and institutions to bolster relations with them and gain further political, material, and diplomatic support for the Palestinian and Arab struggle.

3. Bolstering the course hostile to imperialism, Zionism, and racial discrimination in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

4. Supporting peoples' struggle against imperialism and racism to achieve their national liberation, particularly in South Africa, southwest Africa, South America, and Central America, denouncing the alliance between the two racist regimes in Tel Aviv and South Africa that are hostile to the Arab nation and the African peoples, resolutely standing at the side of the African confrontation states in their struggle against the racist Pretorian regime, and supporting the South African and Namibian peoples.

5. Working by all means in the international arena to expose Zionism and its practices in our occupied homeland. This is a stand emphasized by UN Resolution 3379 of 1975 which stressed that Zionism is a form of racism, and working to foil the Zionist-imperialist moves to annul this resolution.

6. Working to develop the positive stands toward our cause in the European states, Japan, Australia, and Canada, and promoting relations with the democratic parties and forces in the capitalist states which support our national inalienable rights.

7. Sharing the world peoples' struggle to achieve world peace, international detente, stop the arms race, avert nuclear war, support the Soviet initiatives in this regard, explain the danger of Israeli and South African nuclear armament against the region and world peace, and work at international forums to make the Middle East a nuclear-free zone.

8. Expressing appreciation for the efforts by the UN secretary general and the UN committee to enable the Palestinian people to exercise their inalienable rights in cooperation with the UN bodies and specialized agencies, particularly in the field of international seminars and conferences with the objective of enlightening world public opinion and explaining to them the true objectives of the Palestinian people's struggle and their national inalienable rights; and praising the efforts of the world's nongovernmental organizations to support the Palestinian people's struggle to achieve their national inalienable rights in their homeland, Palestine.

A Resolution on the International Conference [subhead]

1. Respect for the principles of justice and the UN Charter should constitute the basis of a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East. The continued violation and usurpation of peoples' national rights lead to tension and conflicts jeopardizing peace, and a comprehensive peace in the Middle East cannot be achieved except through an end to the Israeli occupation of all Palestinian and Arab territories and the Palestinian Arab people's recovery of their inalienable national rights, including their right to repatriation, self-determination, and establishment of their independent state on their national soil in accordance with the UN resolutions. The conflict in the Middle East is taking place in an important and sensitive part of the world and its continuation affects world peace and security. In light of this we must proceed from the objectives of the Palestinian and Arab struggle to find a just and honorable solution to our just cause. We must take account of the sincere international efforts and initiatives to establish a just peace in the Middle East and the world at large, foremost among them the UN and Nonaligned Movement efforts and the numerous Soviet initiatives. Since the Palestine question is the crux of the Middle East issue, and now that it has been proved to the world that unilateral and partial solutions only come at the expense of the Palestinian people's inalienable national rights, and consequently, further complicate and ignite the situation in the Middle East; and while we stress our rejection and condemnation of the Camp David policy and its results, we emphasize that the establishment of a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East should be accomplished through sincere collective efforts that respect the principles of justice and the UN Charter. They must support — as a means to attain this just and comprehensive peace — the convocation of a real and effective international conference with full powers under UN supervision. The PLO's right to participate in this conference as an independent party on an equal footing with other concerned parties should be guaranteed. We also express our support for the formation of a preparatory committee for this conference in which all the permanent UN Security Council member states would participate with the aim of adopting the necessary measures to convene it.

2. Affirmation of the PNC resolutions which announced that any resolutions or agreements issued by the international conference on the Middle East crisis and the Palestine question will not be binding on the Palestinian people and will be considered null and void if they do not give the PLO the right to attend and participate in the conference on an equal footing with the other concerned parties and if they do not enable the Palestinian people to regain their national rights.

PNC's Khalid al-Hasan on PLO-Arab Relations

JN210825 Paris Radio Monte Carlo in Arabic
1703 GMT 20 May 87

[Interview with Khalid al-Hasan, "official in charge of foreign and parliamentary affairs in the PNC," by Antoine Nawfal in Paris; date not given — recorded]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] [Nawfal] The PNC is said to have been held to discuss Palestinian participation in the international conference. Is such a gathering feasible, and how will the Palestinians be represented outside of a Jordanian delegation?

[Al-Hasan] For the PLO, the international conference is a basic national battle. The PLO's presence at the international conference means the establishment of a Palestinian state; that is, if it attends as an independent party, as the PLO, the Palestinian people's sole legitimate representative. Therefore, to the PLO, the conference is a phased aim for which we struggle. Morever, given the explosive situation in the Middle East, which threatens world peace, and as the international climate is forcing the two superpowers to reconcile, we can say that the conference is a probability. [passage omitted]

[Nawfal] Let us assume the conference does convene. Does the PLO object to being represented solely by Jordan?

[Al-Hasan] Of course. The U.S.-Zionist strategy, and the British strategy before that, are based on a refusal to recognize the Palestinian people. Throughout the British mandate over Palestine, no British government received Palestinian figures as representatives of their Palestinian people. They received them as Palestinian gentlemen [preceding two words in English], meaning respectable Palestinians. Therefore, the whole idea is based on the notion that the Palestinian people do not exist, for recognizing the Palestinian people means recognizing their rights. This explains their refusal to recognize the PLO. If they recognize it, they must recognize Palestinian rights. They want to discuss not rights but borders. Therefore, the Palestinians' absence from the international conference is in the interests of the Zionist entity; it is diametrically opposed to the interests of the Palestinians. As such, the conference will not discuss Palestinian rights but borders between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

As a result, an old notion has resurfaced recently. It says the PLO might be called in after the conclusion of talks between the Arab states and the Zionist entity. This means the Palestinian question will be discussed only to secure its liquidation. Thus, the absence of the Palestinians from an international conference will be the coup de grace for the Palestinian cause.

[Nawfal] In any case, this controversy will continue for a long time. We have seen that the PNC session in Algiers was cause for displeasure. Egypt and Morocco were angry and Syria does not seem satisfied. What do you think of all these developments and relations with the Arab states?

[Al-Hasan] Syria's position is different, as it took its stand before the PNC. It is illogical to say the PNC's success would lead to normal ties with Syria. Otherwise, there would not have been any differences with Syria in the first place. Things go far deeper than that. I reiterate that the Syrian-Palestinian dispute has nothing to do with the Palestinian cause or Yasir 'Arafat. The problem is over Syria's priorities in Lebanon. Syria's current priority is Lebanon, and not the Palestinian cause.

As for Jordan, I think Jordan began the process of estrangement months before the PNC session with its announcement freezing the Amman accord. Then came Zayd al-Rifa'i's statement that the dialogue with the PLO should pick up where it left off, with Resolution 242. It is no secret that the PLO rejects 242. Yet, the PNC resolution on Jordan was practical and logical. I hope the Executive Committee will manage to engineer a rapprochement with Jordan and that our ties will be restored to normal.

As for Egypt, I do not understand why it is angry. However, it is not sensitive to the Palestinians. It fears neither a drop in the popularity of any party nor the emergence of new leaders. It is not even affected by differences with the PLO. Therefore, I feel that what happened this time was less drastic than what occurred at the 16th PNC session. I think relations with Egypt will be back to normal in a very short time, as the Executive Committee formed a group under 'Arafat to handle ties with Cairo.

The only country with the right to be angry was Morocco, as that case did not involve any dispute. Morocco feared that a Polisario representative would be invited to the PNC meeting in Algiers. Therefore, before the Moroccan delegation left Rabat, it wanted to be certain that no Polisario delegates would be there, and it received such assurances. The Moroccans arrived at Algiers airport and again asked the Palestinian official there to greet them if a Polisario representative would be attending. They did not ask this question out of some desire to accept or reject anything. They said they would withdraw if a Polisario representative were there to avoid any embarrassment. Therefore, we will not attend if the Polisario representative does. They were reassured he would not be there for the simple reason he had not been invited.

The opening session was held without the Polisario representative. The Moroccan delegation was present. It represented all of Morocco's parliamentary parties and the government, and even included a personal representative of His Majesty King Hassan. Everything went normally until something happened suddenly. We are guests. In Arab countries, the guest, even if he is conducting official business, is not completely free. His freedom is restricted by the desires of his host. In any case, what happened happened. We could have tolerated it had it not been for the wording of the Polisario representative's speech. It had nothing to do with morality, logic, politics, or diplomacy. The description he used cannot be employed against any country in the world, let alone Morocco. As such, it was an insult to Morocco. The Palestinian leaders were trying to placate the Moroccan delegation, which walked out. We hoped to bring them back when the Polisario representative had had his say. However, we could not get the Moroccans back into the hall, even though the Polisario representative had already left, for he stayed only 15 minutes, just to deliver his address.

Thus, Morocco had the right to be angry about this insult. As chairman of the PNC's foreign and parliamentary affairs department, I publicly apologize for what happened. We had no control

over what happened; we did not plan it. At the same time, I would like to say that His Majesty King Hassan II seeks no palliatives. There was no mediation with the Moroccan monarch; there was only a period of calm. The Moroccan king had mediated between us and several Arab regimes. He was a positive mediator at that. His performance in this area was better than we expected, as it was a case of an Arab regime mediating with another Arab regime on behalf of the PLO. Therefore, I am certain this anger will disappear now that the month of Ramadan is with us and the PLO representative has attended the king's special meetings, held daily at the large mosque in Rabat where he makes speeches. I believe the matter will be resolved satisfactorily.

[Nawfal] Now about Syria after the PNC. Do you feel these relations have improved?

[Al-Hasan] If I am right, our differences with Syria are not political. Personally, I think there are no political differences between the PLO position and Syria's declared policy on the Palestinian cause. As for Palestinian representation and independent decisionmaking, I do not believe this is a basic Syrian stand. After all, our understanding of independent Palestinian national decisionmaking does not mean a separate solution. Thus, this issue can be solved with Syria. If I am right in saying the situation in Lebanon has made that country Syria's top priority at the moment, there will be no return to warm, intimate ties with Syria unless the Lebanese problem is solved one way or another, or unless there is a conviction that the Palestinian element is basic, required, or useful in ending the Palestinian dispute in Lebanon's interest. If I am right, the restoration of PLO-Syrian relations to normal is unlikely in the short-term.

[Nawfal] What about your personal relationship with Abu 'Ammar [Yasir 'Arafat] following reports of a chill?

[Al-Hasan] It seems we in the Arab world must learn how to agree and disagree within the political framework. We should realize that political disagreement does not mean estrangement and that political agreement does not means subservience. Regrettably, agreement in the Arab world means subservience and disagreement means estrangement, war, or hostility. Personally, I have no problems with Brother Yasir 'Arafat. Reports that Khalid al-Hasan is an alternative to Yasir 'Arafat mean nothing to me now. As long as he is alive, no one will fight him for his position. I told him: You are like the pope. You will remain in your place and no man, sane or crazy, will dispute your position, especially now that you have become a symbol for our people. Hence, the differences are not personal and are not aggressive like those of the Arabs. Regrettably, even differences between governments affect the people, who are suffering from the disputes of their leaders. Our differences center on the overall course of action, and as Yasir 'Arafat is the leader, the dispute will be with Abu 'Ammar.

I believe the 1973 war and its results, the agreement on the disengagement of forces, the Camp David accords, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the split supported by certain parties, the Tripoli war, our departure from Beirut, Reagan's initiative, the Arab Fes plan, and finally the camps war have caused a qualitative change. For the first time in the history of the Palestine cause, some Arabs enjoy the shedding of Palestinian blood through silence or action. This should not continue. Thus, the issue must be reassessed, priorities rearranged, and institutions rebuilt in accordance with today's new challenges and demands. This is the subject of the differences, and it is natural.

[Nawfal] Is your stopover in Paris today a short one, or is it the start of a number of meetings?

[Al-Hasan] It may not be short. It is exploratory and designed to allow an exchange of views, as the entire region is experiencing an international vacuum. The Irangate scandal has shaken the world more than its volatile issues. Therefore, we should take advantage of this vacuum to reach a higher level of understanding and hold a further exchange of views with those having interests in the Middle East. Europe falls in this category and France has a great role to play.

[Nawfal] Thank you Brother Khalid. You are welcome in Paris and at Radio Monte Carlo. I believe there will be other meetings soon, God willing.

[Al-Hasan] Thank you.

Algeria Lodges Protest

JN271931 Abu Dhabi WAM in Arabic 1810 GMT 27 May 87

[Text] Abu Dhabi, 27 May (WAM) — The newspaper *Al-Ittihad* notes that Algeria has lodged a strong protest with the PLO over its position on the Polisario. Citing Palestinian sources, the paper said Algerian Ambassador in Tunis Messaoud Ait Chalal submitted this protest on Sunday to Faruq Qaddumi, head of the PLO's Political Department. The protest concerns statements by Khalid al-Hasan, alias Abu al-Sa'id, on the Polisario representative's presence at the PNC session. The sources added that Qaddumi reassured the Algerian envoy that these remarks do not reflect the views of the PLO.

Al-Najjab Discusses Results of PNC Session

JN270839 Kuwait AL-ANBA' in Arabic 24 May 87 p 23

[Interview with Sulayman al-Najjab, member of the PLO Executive Committee and the Palestinian Communist Party Politburo, by Mahmud Khalil — date and place not given]

[Text] [Khalil] What is your assessment of the political and organizational results of the PNC's national unity session in Algiers?

[Al-Najjab] We consider the session a great victory for Palestinian patriotism, the Palestinian cause, and the PLO. Our people, as well as our friends and brothers who firmly support a united PLO and the Palestinian people's cause, truly appreciate this triumph. PLO unity was strengthened at this meeting, and the world expressed solidarity with our people and cause. Peace-loving national progressive forces voiced their deep appreciation of our cause and our people's struggle. These are very important weapons which we will use in the future in our fight to recover our people's rights.

The unitary session has certainly assigned great tasks and placed heavy responsibilities on every Palestinian and on the PLO and its Executive Committee. We begin our work relying on our people's enthusiasm and support, on our clear vision, and on what we must do in Palestinian, Arab, and international terms. Clearly, the forces that were counting on continued dissent in the PLO, and which tried to wreck efforts for unity until the very second before the PNC convened will not stop their sabotage and plotting. Therefore, we consider our accomplishment at the unitary session a great thing, and we all have the duty to preserve it. We should prevent anyone from undermining this great gain. Thus, we believe that past sensitivities, factional disputes, and shortsightedness in dealing with certain issues should end. We should propagate the unitary climate and promote it in every sector of our national struggle.

[Khalil] As a new member of the PLO Executive Committee representing the Palestinian Communist Party, how do you view future PLO political moves in the Arab world and internationally? Do you think the PLO's political activities will change?

[Al-Najjab] We now have specific political tasks arising from the recent PNC resolutions, which determined the Executive Committee's Arab and international activities. On the Arab level, it was emphasized that relations between the PLO and the fraternal Arab states should be based on Arab summit resolutions, mutual respect, and the adoption of national Palestinian positions and national unanimity. These should be the foundation of Arab solidarity and support for the Palestinian people and their cause. Thus, we hope the PNC resolutions will help unite Arab stands behind our fight. We also hope this will expedite an Arab summit.

On the popular Palestinian Arab level, we will also seek the backing of forces that have taken up our just cause in dealing with the conspiracies being hatched against us. We also look forward to greater Arab participation in our fight to guarantee the Palestinian people's rights and protect Arab peoples and countries from the danger of Israeli expansion and aggression, U.S. hegemony, and the U.S.-Israeli strategic alliance.

Our international position is very clear, especially where the conference is concerned. The PNC resolutions defined our idea of this conference, its task, and those who should participate in it in accordance with UN resolutions and under UN supervision. There is no doubt that this clear Palestinian stand, which is widely supported, particularly by the friendly Soviet Union, together with a better understanding of the matter by some West European countries, will increase the number of states calling for such a gathering as we see it. Our concept is based on guaranteeing the Palestinian people's rights and establishing an independent Palestinian state.

[Khalil] How will you on the Executive Committee deal with those Arab countries that are apparently dissatisfied with the PNC resolutions?

[Al-Najjab] We will continue to treat their reaction as we did at the session. In our resolutions on ties with certain Arab states, we tried to remove any obstacles preventing us from obtaining the greatest possible Arab support for our struggle and cause. We refused to get involved in any peripheral battles that serve neither our fight nor Arab solidarity. We know that this clear and responsible policy does not please some, who are now doing their best to Arabize and generalize Camp David, that is, to liquidate the Palestinian people's cause. These parties thought they could exploit past Palestinian divisions, differences, and disputes to attain their objective of liquidating the Palestinian people's cause.

[Khalil] Do you expect these reactions to continue?

[Al-Najjab] We will do everything possible to get the Arab countries to abide by unanimous Arab summit resolutions, particularly those of Rabat and Fes. The quicker these states honor them, the sooner our differences and disputes will end. All these provocations, threats, and pressures will have no effect on the position taken by the Palestinian forces and factions or the Palestinian people, who shaped this unity and this victory.

[Khalil] Has the PLO done anything to avoid an acute crisis in relations with certain Arab states?

[Al-Najjab] We appreciate the support some fraternal countries are giving our rights and cause. These states have helped as much as possible in the unity process. We are grateful for any effort without making concessions or surrendering any of our gains.

[Khalil] On what political basis will you on the Executive Committee act internationally following the abrogation of the Amman accord?

[Al-Najjab] The limited joint activities undertaken by Jordan and the Palestinians under the Amman agreement are known. The same is true of the results of the [PLO delegation's] London trip. The PLO will concentrate on countries directly connected with the international conference. As is well known, the PLO's activity did not stop once the accord was suspended. The PLO's role in the Harare and African and Islamic summit resolutions and in various international bodies has existed and will continue to exist.

This also applies to the militant relations with socialist countries and the Soviet Union. The leading goal here is to stress our shared understanding of the concept of an international conference. We also seek to marshal those forces backing this notion, and to close the door to any idea of making this conference a mere international umbrella leading to direct negotiations.

The horizons are vast and what is important is that we mobilize all our resources and work in the spirit of our national resolutions. We should not allow some mines here and there to divert our attention from our primary target or hinder our movement.

[Khalil] It is clear from your words that the Palestinian factions have agreed on a political plan for international action. Could you give us the broad lines of this plan?

[Al-Najjab] It is as I have said. The political trends are known, and we on the Executive Committee and in the factions will soon give this plan further examination and will implement parts of its as soon as possible.

[Khalil] Does this mean there will be a major move in PLO policy?

[Al-Najjab] Yes, in line with the qualitative move contained in the PNC resolutions and the unity achieved in accordance with them. It is well known that during the era of dissidence much of our energy was wasted on internal disputes. The question now is how can we mobilize all these capabilities to put the PNC resolutions into effect.

[Khalil] The Soviets have apparently given this the green light, as confirmed by Bulgarian President Zhivkov. He told Palestinian leaders at his meeting with them in Algiers that an international conference will be held this year.

[Al-Najjab] I was there, but I did not hear Comrade Zhivkov fix a date for the conference. He concentrated on the need to do everything possible to convene this conference without setting a date. I object to some of the terms you use, such as a Soviet or American green light. Such terms may come from our age, the age of traffic and red, green, and yellow lights. In politics these do not have innocent meanings. Under conditions of unity and differences, the Soviet position was a green light, that is, a firm principled stand supporting the Palestinian people's inalienable national rights and backing their struggle to free their land, return to their homes, determine their destiny, and establish an independent state under the PLO, their sole legitimate representative. The USSR refused to deal with any substitutes for the PLO, and did a tremendous amount of work to recover PLO unity. Its efforts are known to, and appreciated by every nationalist Palestinian.

The restoration of a united Palestinian stand and a clear political position on the international conference will undoubtedly enable us and the Soviet Union to work together. We will benefit from the great dynamism of Soviet political action to get the international conference held, to satisfy the Palestinian people's aspirations, and to guarantee PLO participation in this gathering on an equal footing with the other parties.

[Khalil] What about Palestinian-Syrian relations?

[Al-Najjab] I would like to note with appreciation the responsible way in which all the Palestinian factions dealt with relations with Syria during the comprehensive dialogue and the PNC session. The PNC's final statement outlined the basis for this relationship on the principle of a common hatred of imperialism and Zionist expansion and on confrontation of capitulatory solutions. This is a firm foundation and cornerstone of the strong Palestinian-Syrian alliance. It is well known that there are now difficulties and problems in our ties. Nevertheless, we consider the recovery of PLO unity at the 18th PNC session in Algiers a weapon and a great incentive to improve and develop Palestinian-Syrian relations. We do not expect all our problems to be solved overnight, but we do believe that fundamental steps have been taken toward solving them and that it is now only a matter of time.

[Khalil] Does this mean work is still under way to revive the front of steadfastness and confrontation?

[Al-Najjab] As I said, the subject was raised with Khalid al-Fahum.

[Khalil] Is it continuing after the PNC session?

[Al-Najjab] I said these positions on our side as Palestinians are still being proposed. Other brothers share our opinion.

[Khalil] How true are the reports of a Palestinian meeting in Moscow.?

[Al-Najjab] I have heard nothing of the sort. However, during its first meeting, the Executive Committee instructed me, Comrade Abu 'Ali Mustafa [Mustafa al-Zibri], and Yasir 'Abd Rabbuh to begin contacts with Palestinian factions and PNC members who did not participate in the recent session. Our goal was to enable them to play their role in the PLO. We also hope to make work with Syrian leaders to develop relations in light of what was accomplished at the PNC unitary session.

[Khalil] Do you expect PLO Executive Committee Chairman Yasir 'Arafat to return to Damascus soon?

[Al-Najjab] This is a press question that looks like an old one. We have always said militant relations are founded on a common fight against imperialism and mutual respect for the independence of each party. As for Brother Abu 'Ammar's [Yasir 'Arafat] visit, we still believe it has been held up for political reasons.

West Bank, Gaza Palestinians To Form Party

JN280626 Cairo UKTUBAR in Arabic 24 May 87 p 10

[By Mariam Rubin]

[Text] The Palestinians living in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip have decided to form a political organization, which will be named the Palestinian Confederation Party [Al-Hizb al-Kunfidarali al-Filastini]. The new group intends to convince various Palestinian parties of the need for a confederation with Jordan. The party's most important principles are the condemnation of terrorism and a belief in political struggle and dialogue by offering a comprehensive view of a political solution to end the Arab-Israeli dispute.

The new party's ideas on a political solution include the following points:

1. Residents of the occupied territories represent the cornerstone of a solution. They bear the responsibility for presenting and defending opinions.

2. Contacts will be held with all parties to attain independence and end the occupation.

3. Efforts will be made to get Israel to hand over power to residents of the occupied territories. This ultimately implies the establishment of a Palestinian state in the occupied areas. Once this is done, it will be possible to contact the Jordanian people to form a confederation, thus achieving unity between the Palestinian and Jordanian peoples.

KUWAIT

Eritrean Delegation Arrives on 1-Week Visit

LD221503 Kuwait KUNA in Arabic 1208 GMT 22 May 87

[Text] Kuwait, 22 May (KUNA) — A delegation from the Eritrean Liberation Front arrived here last night at the start of a Gulf tour designed to explain developments affecting the Eritrean cause and to brief regional officials on achievements in various fields of Eritrean and international endeavor.

The delegation, led by the front's chairman, 'Abdullah Idris Muhammad, includes Muhammad 'Ali Idris, member of the Executive Committee and head of the Bureau for External Relations.

The UAE is expected to be the Eritreans' second stop after Kuwait, where they will stay about a week.

OMAN

Finance Official on Gulf Situation, Oil Prices

PM271107 London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 22 May 87 pp 44-45

[Interview with Qasim al-Zawawi, deputy prime minister for financial and economic affairs, by Amin al-Siba'i in Muscat; date not given]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] *Al-Hawadith*: A visitor to Oman today would notice the development that has affected all fields in a very short time. Have you been able to build a strong economy capable of meeting Oman's needs and consistent with the speed with which the state is growing in all spheres?

Qasim al-Zawawi: What we have been able to achieve in the Sultanate of Oman is evident in all fields and development projects. If we look back and review what has been accomplished, we can see that it is indeed great. We can see that his majesty's government has attached great importance to building and completing an infrastructure for basic services meeting the citizens' needs. This was at a time when the Gulf countries and the world looked at us as a nascent country needing expertise. In fact, not too long ago, we required those basic things that any state needs and we did not have. This was in the early seventies. Thanks to our determination to succeed and provide our people with their needs, we have been able to achieve what you see today in all fields of development. [passage omitted]

Al-Hawadith: What was the effect of the reduction in oil prices on these programs and projects?

Qasim al-Zawawi: Following the reduction in oil prices, we found we had to resort to measures that would lessen its effects and rely on other resources to be able to continue implementing development projects. [passage omitted]

Al-Hawadith: There is military and political tension in the Gulf because of the Iraq-Iran war and the question of freedom of passage and shipping in waterways in the Strait of Hormuz. What effect is this having on Oman economically?

Qasim al-Zawawi: Even before the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war the Sultanate of Oman called on all the Gulf countries, including Iraq and Iran, to engage in dialogue on a formula that would protect and guarantee the security of waterways, which are the responsibility of all the countries, not just one, in view of their economic and strategic role,

We believe it is in everyone's interest to preserve peace in maritime passages and to prevent foreign interference in the affairs of the area when conflicts break out between countries in the region.

We have always demanded that waterways remain free of war and disputes. We consider ourselves reponsible for ensuring this because such passages exist in the territorial waters of the Sultanate of Oman. But at the same time they are international waterways like any other international waterways. Therefore, any war or dispute, like the Iraq-Iran war, threatens the safety and freedom of these passages, as well as the Strait of Hormuz. Such a situation cannot be in the interest of any party, neither the Gulf countries, nor Iraq and Iran, nor the rest of the world. Therefore, Oman is still calling on everybody to try to keep these waterways free from the effects of war and to prevent clashes, which could create an opportunity for intervention by countries outside the region.

I believe a commitment to respecting freedom of these principal passages in the Gulf is a fundamental necessity. Countries, including Iraq and Iran, should respect these waterways. This situation is not directly affecting Oman in this respect, but certainly it has its economic and political effects. We are no less interested in the matter than any other country.

If freedom of passage in the Gulf is affected, then this will probably affect the Gulf of Oman as well. We cannot ignore such a possibility, although some would like to think Oman might not be affected if the Strait of Hormuz faced certain dangers, because it has other sea approaches and outlets. This is absolutely not true.

Al-Hawadith: What progress has been made in economic cooperation and participation between Oman and the GCC?

Qasim al-Zawawi: The amount of Oman's contribution, as you know, is quite considerable given our resources. Oman is playing an eminently positive role in the GCC. We believe cooperation should precede decisionmaking because certain decisions might run into trouble if made without coordination and consultation. What matters is the adoption of studied decisions that can be implemented and not the number of decisions.

Gulf cooperation is proceeding toward laying down a program to form the basis of cooperation in the fields of customs and excise, imports and exports, agriculture, and industry. This program will be implemented in stages, taking into consideration a principal matter — the disparity in incentives among the Gulf states. We believe the unification of incentives is a vital issue in cooperation between us. If we can achieve this, we can, without disturbing

the economy and throwing it out of balance, gradually proceed toward standardizing customs tariffs; unifying electricity resources; opening the gates to skilled workers to work in the Gulf states; permitting the transfer of capital between these states; and allowing work in them to be free from the complications involved in investments. This is on the condition the GCC states want to implement the economic unity agreement. This is something that should be considered and studied thoroughly. This is what is actually taking place. After launching the cooperation experiment we found that the resolutions adopted and put into effect have given the Gulf citizen greater opportunities for work and investment. Projects in the private sector are now being carried out through cooperation among the Gulf countries, and a considerable number of these are considered successful, such as the Gulf Investment Institution, which has been engaged in fruitful activities and projects. In this regard, we have no need to attract capital from abroad, but rather to study the feasibility of every project before it is implemented so investments in two or more Gulf countries will not lead to projects that have a competitor in the other country or countries, such as cement and iron or other products, in order to avoid the dangers of competition and bad planning.

Al-Hawadith: Can it be said that the GCC countries are approaching a Gulf common market similar to the EEC, or economic unity?

Qasim al-Zawawi: Gradually we will reach the goal you are talking about, but only after thorough and continuous study and learning from the experience of others, such as the EEC; and without copying the experiments of others, because every country or group of countries has its own circumstances and characteristics.

Al-Hawadith: What about the project for linking the Gulf oilfields to the Sultanate of Oman's coast to facilitate oil exports and thus avoid the danger of war?

Qasim al-Zawawi: There is a study on this project to define the course of a pipeline through Omani territory. The matter is still being studied by the GCC oil ministers, but no decision has yet been made on the subject.

I believe that, whether there is war or not, the GCC countries should consider building a pipeline to the Omani coast and another to the Red Sea coast. This should not be confined only to oil but should also apply to all the commodities that the GCC countries import from abroad.

Al-Hawadith: Can it be said that the improvement in oil prices has marked the beginning of the end of the economic crisis?

Qasim al-Zawawi: We must be clear in saying that the price of a barrel of oil will not return to the 28, 34, 38, 42, or 44 dollar level anytime soon. The improvement in prices in general is in the interest of both the producing and consuming countries, provided this takes place gradually. Oil prices, as in the case of any other commodity, are based on supply and demand. We must implement an intelligent and studied policy in this respect. OPEC countries must honor the production quotas so they will be able to protect their interests and obtain a suitable price for the oil, as happened at recent OPEC meetings. If the price improvement continues at the present rate, then I would expect the economic situation to stabilize at the beginning of the nineties.

SAUDI ARABIA

King Fahd Calls for Minisummit in Riyadh

JN261248 Abu Dhabi AL-ITTIHAD in Arabic 25 May 87 pp 1, 8

[By 'Atif 'Awdah]

[Text] Rabat — *Al-Ittihad* has learned that Saudi Arabia is discussing with a number of Arab states the idea of holding a minisummit in Riyadh to precede the comprehensive Arab summit scheduled to be held in September.

A political source informed *Al-Ittihad* that the Saudi monarch has proposed to a number of Arab leaders that a minisummit be held to discuss the problems hindering the convention of the expanded summit. The contacts included Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and the PLO. The source revealed that there are some obstacles impeding the convocation of the minisummit and said Saudi efforts are currently being made at the highest level to surmount these obstacles. Among the barriers is Iraq's call for the adoption of a clear stand on the Iraq-Iran war, the differences between Syria and the PLO over the Palestinian presence in Lebanon, and the national unity formula, which the PNC approved at its latest session.

The source affirmed that the minisummit, in which President Saddam Husayn, President Hafiz al-Asad, King Husayn, and PLO Chairman Yasir 'Arafat will participate, may be convened before the scheduled meeting between U.S. and Soviet officials on the international conference.

Al-Ittihad has also learned that Saudi delegations will tour many Arab capitals after 'Id al-Fitr to explain the upcoming Saudi step concerning the summit.

Crown Prince 'Abdallah Delivers 'Id al-Fitr Speech

LD281143 Riyadh SPA in Arabic 1907 GMT 27 May 87

[Text] Al-Ta'if, 27 May (SPA) — Here is the text of a speech by His Royal Highness Crown Prince 'Abdallah ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, deputy prime minister and commander of the National Guard, on the occasion of 'Id al-Fitr:

In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate:

Praise be to God and prayers and peace be on the most honorable messenger, our master and prophet, Muhammad, God's prayers and peace be on him and all his family and followers.

Citizens who are honored by Islam, brothers and sons, brave men of the Armed Forces, may God's peace, mercy, and blessings be upon you.

On this happy occasion, it pleases me to congratulate you and all Muslims for fasting on Ramadan and 'Id al-Fitr, praying to God to endow these days with prosperity and blessings for us and all Muslims.

Brother citizens, it is one of God's blessings that this honorable 'Id comes amid an atmosphere full of optimism and hope, as your glorious kingdom — through God's help, and the custodian of the two holy mosques' guidance and your sincere cooperation — has proved it is able to confront every crisis and treat it with the customary wisdom of manhood and with men's will. This is not surprising as this will, supported by belief in God, is able to tame even fierce circumstances and control them, their course, and direction.

Brother citizens, every country has its mission, but your Kingdom has the highest. How we perform our mission depends on our being inspired by our past in pushing our present toward a better future. This necessitates sincere cooperation between citizens and officials. Citizenship is tied to responsibility in the same way rights and duties are linked. It will not become patriotism unless it is coupled with sacrifice and giving. Let us know that what the state gives is the actual return of what the citizens give. Therefore, now is the time for the money imprisoned in boxes and estranged from the homeland to emerge from the boxes and return from exile, and for contributions to be made to the construction of a strong state and happy society, for within your Kingdom there is the widest scope for hope and the most honorable opportunity for work. There should be no complacency or fear of failure.

Honorable brothers, since the time of the late founder, King 'Abd al-'Aziz, until the era of the custodian of the two holy mosques, the Kingdom considered, and still considers, the Arab world to be a civilized essence and not a geographical term for a territory. This is emphasized by our unity of faith and history. Therefore, the unity of expression was, and still is, our means to preserve our civilized heritage and enrich its contents.

This has led the Kingdom to adopt a policy of reconciliation among Arabs as the main theme of its Arab policy. The blessed efforts made by the custodian of the two holy mosques to reconcile the dear sisters, the Kingdom of Morocco and the Algerian Republic,was no more than an extension and the exercise of this policy.

I will not hide from you, honorable brothers, that so far I do not know one logical reason for this alienating dispersal of the Arabs. However, what brings optimism is that there are no roots for these differences among the Arab people. Therefore, the waves we see crashing on the surface will not make the bottom turbid and will not shake the nation's trust in God and, consequently, in itself and its future.

Honorable brothers, I do not need to stress our firm stand on the Palestinian issue. It is the pivotal issue for the Arab and the Islamic worlds. However, I would say with all affection and sincerity to our brother Palestinians in particular, and our brother Arabs in general, that the Palestinian issue is too great for us to involve it in Arab bargaining and international equations. Unanimity for supporting it is there; therefore, let us leave this issue above all maneuvers, trickery, and tactics: Non-essentials must not obliterate the main purpose.

Dear brothers, is it not time for dear sister Lebanon to emerge from its hell and return to exercise its effective role? Is it not time for its leaders to ask themselves whether their differences on the division of jobs and functions is worth Lebanon's decline from the nadir of prosperity to the abyss of misery and destruction?

I say to the dear Lebanese brothers: There is no state, side, or person other than yourselves, the Lebanese brothers, who can save Lebanon from those horrific whirlpools of destruction and poverty; and that your path toward this salvation rests in objective patriotism rather than selfish sectarianism.

Dear brothers, the rabid war, the mill of destruction and death between the two Islamic neighbor countries, Iraq and Iran, today enters an extremely dangerous stage, one which not only heralds the conflict's regional widening but also its explosion internationally, something that will bring nothing good to any of the region's states.I fear that the excitement of anger has paralyzed the ability to distinguish between the shadows of illusion and the light of truth.

This war is today leading the region toward a frightfully horrific future, since foreign domination formerly infiltratedthrough much narrower windows than the ones now provided by this rabid war. I appeal to the brothers in Tehran, after sister Iraq has responded to the peace appeal, to contemplate the ominous alarms on the horizon. Contemplation of tomorrow is essential for the understanding of today.

Dear brothers, on this blessed occasion I address a greeting of admiration to the fraternal Afghan people who struggle for the glory of Islam and the dignity of Muslims. There is no doubt that this brave people's jihad is an extension of that of their forefathers, who defeated death by martyrdom, swept the world for the sake of heaven, and proved that the capability of the believer makes it possible to achieve the impossible. We are confident, brother mujahidin, of your victory, as we trust in God the Almighty. We are with you no matter how long the journey through the night lasts. Peace, God's mercy, and blessings be upon you.

2 Policemen Reported Shot Near Al-Ma'adi 28 May

NC290458 Beirut Domestic Service in Arabic 0430 GMT 29 May 87

[Text] In today's edition, the Cairo newspaper *Al-Ahram* reports that two policemen were shot by two unidentified individuals yesterday morning, Thursday, in the Dar al-Salam area near Al-Ma'adi, in Cairo's southern suburbs. The paper says the two unidentified persons fired on a police motorbike patrol, but gave no further details.

It should be noted that this incident comes only 2 days after the attack on a U.S. Embassy vehicle carrying three embassy officials in Al-Ma'adi; two of those officials were slightly wounded.

Minister Says Gulf Events Beginning of War's End

NC280811 Cairo MENA in Arabic 2255 GMT 27 May 87

[Excerpts] Cairo, 27 May (MENA) — Dr 'Ismat 'Abd al-Majid, deputy prime minister and foreign minister, has expressed his belief that events in the Gulf are a real introduction to attaining a peaceful solution to the Iraq-Iran war. He noted that the U.S. and Soviet presence in that region, as long as it is not intended to bring on a military confrontation, will lead to negotiations.

In an interview to be published in Thursday's edition of *Al-Jumhuriyah*, the foreign minister said efforts are now being made at the highest level to end the Gulf war. He stated that Egypt supports such work out of a desire to end the bloodshed and guarantee security and stability for the Gulf countries. [passage omitted]

Dr 'Abd al-Majid also emphasized Egypt's unwavering commitment to the Palestinian cause, explaining that the decision to close down PLO offices was in response to the adoption of a hostile position.

He warned of the consequences of abrogating the Cairo accord, particularly as far as the defense of the Palestinian camps in Lebanon is concerned. He said the responsibility for defending the Palestinians there is a collective one, which must be borne by the Arab countries and taken into account by all Islamic states.

Dr 'Abd al-Majid praised ties between Egypt and the two superpowers, saying: Our strong and distinctive relationship with the United States is based on mutual interests. We appreciate the contributions the United States makes to the Egyptian economy and its support for Egypt during negotiations with the World Bank, the IMF, and the Paris Club. He noted that the question of high interest rates on military debts is as yet unresolved, but that talks are continuing to settle this matter in line with the close links between the two parties.

The foreign minister described Egyptian-Soviet relations as promising, noting that the Soviet position on the debt question has been positive. He also said the Soviet deputy foreign minister will visit Cairo soon.

He added: We welcome relations as long as they are based on mutual respect and joint interests; then there are no problems.

AL-AHRAM Assails Abrogation of Cairo Agreement

NC290514 Cairo MENA in Arabic 2025 GMT 28 May 87

[Text] Cairo, 28 May (MENA) — The newspaper *Al-Ahram* notes the questionable decision, purportedly issued on behalf of the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies, abrogating the Cairo agreement, which governs the Palestinian presence in Lebanon. This decision, the paper says, shows that certain Arab and Lebanese circles, as well as Israel, are still working to eliminate the Palestinian presence and divide Lebanon into weak, sectarian agent states.

In its Friday edition, *Al-Ahram* notes that this questionable decision, which was made after an illegal meeting attended by only 45 deputies, indicates the Shi'ite Amal Movement's determination, with Syrian agreement and to Israel's satisfaction, to pursue the camps war waged against the Palestinians. The Arabs have remained silent, thus demonstrating the extent of their impotence and deterioration. The paper says that those who planned this suspect decision, and insisted on carrying it out at this particular time, are only seeking to disguise their bloody plan against the Palestinians with a legal cover. This bloody plan began at Tall al-Za'tar, continued during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the siege of Beirut, and the expulsion [of Palestinians] from Tripoli, and entered its final and decisive stage during the so-called camps war.

Al-Ahram adds that those who planned this suspect decision have ignored the fact that there could be serious reactions if it is enforced. These reactions might have negative effects on the entire Lebanese situation and foment a more ferocious and violent civil war, particularly since several important forces in Lebanon, including the Druze, have denounced the abrogation.

Al-Ahram then says that perhaps this issue will teach the Palestinian leaders a lesson. The Palestinian leaders' policy of surrender to the minority at the recent PNC meeting in Algiers has caused rifts in the PLO's relations with its real friends in the Arab world. This policy gave the opponents of the Palestinian leaders and resistance the impression that the time was ripe to implement their suspicious plans. The paper concludes by saying that perhaps what has happened will cause all Lebanese parties towake up and realize the dimensions of this suspect scheme, which is aimed not only against the Palestinian presence but also against Lebanon as a whole.

President Visits I Special Army Corps Sector

JN281248 Baghdad Voice of the Masses in Arabic 1200 GMT 28 May 87

[Text] President Saddam Husayn, commander in chief of the Armed Forces, has visited the I Special Army Corps sector. He met with its commander and officers. They congratulated the president on the blessed 'Id al-Fitr and asked Almighty God to support and help Iraq under President Saddam Husayn's wise leadership.

During his tour, his excellency was given assurances of the readiness and measures to repulse the evil aggressors, the enemies of right and peace.

The I Special Army Corps commander presented his excellency with a gift expressing complete faith in God and victory. It also reflects the continuous challenge to confront the tyrannical enemy anytime, anywhere to crush its remains.

Armed Forces Command Issues Communique No 2,691

JN281628 Baghdad Voice of the Masses in Arabic 1600 GMT 28 May 87

[Communique No 2,691 issued by the Armed Forces General Command on 28 May 1987]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Our units carried out the following activities last night and today:

1. The pilots of our bold helicopter gunships flew 43 combat missions against enemy units in the operational areas, inflicting further losses in men and materiel on the Khomeyniites. Our aircraft then returned safely to base, praise be to God.

2. Our units on the VII Army Corps front managed, through their brave activities against the enemy, to deal the aggressors new losses, on top of the following confirmed figures: two enemy soldiers killed and number of others wounded; one 106-mm gun destroyed and its crew killed; one shovel [preceding word in English] destroyed and another shovel and a bulldozer damaged.

3. One of our units in the V Army Corps northern sector spotted and fired on an enemy group, killing six scoundrels and wounding others. The rest fled.

4. Formations from our units in the III Army Corps sector east of Al-Basrah disrupted enemy engineering operations using all types of weapons. Elsewhere in the same sector, several infantry positions and a vehicle were destroyed and two ammunition dumps were demolished.

5. The criminal enemy shelled residential areas in Al-'Uzayr with long-range artillery, damaging some homes.

[Signed] The Armed Forces General Command, 28 May 1987

Government Denies Claims of Battles in North

JN281721 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1645 GMT 28 May 87

[Text] Baghdad, 28 May (INA) — An Iraqi military spokesman has dismissed Iranian claims of battles in the border areas of northern Iraq as lies showing the military failure of the Iranian regime and its agents.

Commenting to INA on these claims, the military spokesman said the Iranian regime resorts to a series of daily lies that are completely baseless. He indicated that some try to exploit this regime's stupidity for material gain on the pretext of scoring imaginary victories.

He stressed that no Iraqi helicopter was downed and that security in the northern border regions is undisturbed. He challenged the Iranians to prove the opposite. He added that Iraq pays no attention to trashy words, noting that people inside and outside Iran are used to hearing such allegations, which do not even fool the naive.

Concluding, the military spokesman advised the Iranian Government to stop such useless lies, declaring: After 7 years of war during which it has told all sorts of lies and made false claims, that government should have abandoned the policy but, as is obvious, lies are its only asset.

Oil Minister Returns After Pipeline Talks in Turkey

JN281314 Baghdad Voice of the Masses in Arabic 1200 GMT 28 May 87

[Text] Oil Minister 'Isam 'Abd al-Rahim and his delegation returned to Baghdad from Ankara last night after a 1-day visit to Turkey. During the trip, there was a meeting of the bilateral ministerial committee to follow up the second phase in the expansion of the Iraqi-Turkish oil pipeline. They also discussed measures related to the pipeline's operation.

In addition, the boards of directors of firms implementing the Iraqi and Turkish parts of the project met, as did representatives of Iraqi and Turkish oil companies.

AL-DUSTUR Views U.S.-Iran 'Secret Relationship'

JN280847 Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 28 May 87 p 15

[News analysis: "The Gulf and the Great Powers' Struggle"]

[Text] The United States confidently pursues its role in the Arab Gulf. Despite congressional opposition to the idea of Kuwaiti oil tankers flying the U.S. flag, the U.S. Administration is proceeding with its plan. One may note the following:

1. The U.S. flag will be raised on Kuwaiti oil tankers next week. This is in addition to America's open protection of freedom of navigation in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. What is important is that Iran's threats are actually no more than slogans. They are not serious and mean nothing. This has always been the case when the United States is concerned. It is evident that, after the U.S. Embassy hostages issue came to an end, the Iranian regime cleared up its relations with the United States. The hostage problem was the basis of a secret relationship between the two countries, with the overt signs forming only a small part. These signs were the suspect arms deal arranged by Israel and the American role in the occupation of Al-Faw and the recent fighting in Basra, through the supply of intelligence to Iran.

Despite all attempts to mask it, the Iranian-U.S. relationship is strategic. It is based on their mutual interest in prolonging the war. Therefore, the U.S. Administration is acting with complete confidence depending on the covert elements of its relationship with the Tehran rulers, a confidence which Reagan expressed when he said there was absolutely no danger of a confrontation between the United States and Iran.

2. Hashemi-Rafsanjani forcefully attacked the USSR a few days ago, and the latter replied for the first time, accusing him of being a U.S. agent. They said he was behind McFarlane's visit and the suspect arms deal. In any case, the Iranian regime is doing a great service on behalf of U.S. influence in the Gulf, which is one of the war's objectives.

3. The United States wants to use the attack on the U.S. frigate as an excuse for NATO interference in the region. However, the United States realizes that NATO countries have some reservations about entering into any confrontation in the Gulf. Perhaps the experience of Lebanon, where the United States dragged NATO countries into committing themselves militarily, and where the United States sullied NATO's reputation, was a lesson for the NATO states. They still refuse to be dragged into any type of confrontation with the Soviets this time. It is also evident the United States is trying to escalate matters in this part of the world to foil any agreements on missiles in Europe. In any event, West Europe has not been concerned from the start with the old schemes on the excuse of protecting the Gulf, starting with the case of the RDF and ending with what is now taking place.

4. It is America's exploitation of this war that is painful, along with the depletion of the region's material resources through the arms deal and similar events. It now seeks to capitalize on the war's prolongation to increase its military influence. This also paves the way for the other great power, the USSR, which says the war is raging on its borders. Therefore, this will lead to a conflict between the two superpowers and will make this vital area an arena of struggle. This can be prevented only if the war ends. We have been saying from the very start of the war that its continuation will open the door to superpower interference.

Air Force Plane Forced To Land in Israel

NC281305 Beirut Domestic Service in Arabic
1238 GMT 28 May 87

[Text] We have some new information about the Lebanese Air Force trainer intercepted by Israeli warplanes west of Sidon and forced to land in Israel. The Fouga Magister plane took off from Halat Air Base at 1205 after receiving a distress signal from a boat carrying five people, which was about to sink due to mechanical problems.

When the plane, piloted by a major and a captain, arrived over the area where the boat was, Israeli warplanes appeared, surrounding the Lebanese aircraft and preventing it from carrying out its rescue mission. Meanwhile, a Lebanese helicopter taking part in the rescue operation was driven off.

At 1235 the Lebanese Air Force Operations Room was informed that the Fouga had been forced to land at an Israeli military airport. Contacts are under way through various channels — the Foreign Ministry, the [Lebanese-Israeli] Armistice Commission, and UNIFIL in the south — to deal with the situation and secure the release of the Lebanese plane and its crew.

Plane Returns to Halat

NC281349 Beirut Domestic Service in Arabic
1343 GMT 28 Amy 87

[Excerpt] As for the Lebanese plane intercepted by Israeli aircraft, Lebanese military sources reported a few minutes ago that the plane, which had been forced to land in Israel, returned to Halat Air Base at 1635. [passage omitted]

Birri Says Present Government Should Continue

NC281856 Beirut Voice of National Resistance in Arabic
0500 GMT 28 May 87

[Text] In an interview with IRNA, Minister Nabih Birri affirmed that an early solution to the government crisis is not expected, adding that the security situation has been stable since the Syrian forces entered West Beirut. Security, Minister Birri said, is linked with national detente, which is being hindered by the United States and Israel. There can be no detente under Zionist occupation, as a liberated south is the way to detente, he declared.

He continued: The government will remain as is until the end of the president's term, which I have emphasized before. If this government's resignation is accepted, the president cannot form a new one.

Regarding reported efforts to expand the government, Minister Birri said: I will refuse to sit in the government with any person linked with Israel. We must be certain such people have severed their links with the enemy. For example, when Elie Hubayqah [former Lebanese Forces chairman] broke off his ties with Israel, we agreed to negotiate with him. What Samir Ja'ja' [current Lebanese Forces commander] or anyone else should do now is break off ties with the enemy. In any case, I reaffirm that a liberated south is necessary for a solution and for detente, a detente involving a political, economic, and security agreement.

He stated that the economic, security, and political situations are linked and inseparable, adding: A political solution will improve the exchange rate and strengthen the economy. Without a political accord there will be no solutions to the other crises, and Lebanon will face starvation and bankruptcy. If we were given the choice of returning to the old system or starving, we would starve, Birri concluded.

Syrian Defense Minister Visits Troops on 'Id al-Fitr

NC290816 Beirut Domestic Service in Arabic
0800 GMT 29 May 87

[Text] Syrian Defense Minister Major General Mustafa Talas has visited the Syrian forces in Riyaq on the occasion of 'Id al-Fitr. He addressed the officers and men, noting that the dignity of the Lebanese Army's 1st Brigade is the same as that of the Syrian Army, and that any harm to this unit harms the Syrian forces.

A luncheon was held to mark the event at the Shtawrah Auberge. It was attended by Syrian officers, the first commander of the Lebanese Army in the Al-Biqa' region, and the head of intelligence in Ablah.

Syrians Target of Two Explosions in Tripoli

NC290500 Beirut Voice of Lebanon in Arabic
2215 GMT 28 May 87

[Text] Two explosions took place in Tripoli tonight, the first on Al-Tall Street and the second near a Syrian post in Al-Zahiriyah. A group calling itself the Lebanese Liberation Front-Fityan 'Ali Organization claimed responsibility for the blasts and said a number of Syrian soldiers were injured.

Hizballah Reportedly Moves SAM-7's to South

NC291139 Beirut Voice of Lebanon in Arabic
1115 GMT 29 May 87

[Text] According to information received by the Voice of Lebanon, Hizballah has recently moved SAM-7 antiaircraft missiles to the south. This type of missile is shoulder held and can hit low flying aircraft.

Group Claims Attacks on Hizballah Officials

NC281643 Beirut Voice of Lebanon in Arabic
1615 GMT 28 May 87

[Text] We have received a report that an organization calling itself the Eagles Front of the Resistance to Khomeyniite Imperialism in Lebanon [Nusur Jabhat Muqawamat al-Imbiryaliyah al-Khumayniyah fi Lubnan] has contacted a foreign news agency in Beirut and claimed responsibility for this week's attacks on Dr Ibrahim 'Atwah, official in charge of Hizballah in Al-Ghaziyah, and Hamid Sidqi, leader of the Revolution Guards in Tyre. The

organization said these punitive operations are designed to deter traitors seeking to sow discord between Lebanon and Syria and establish a Khomeyniite republic in Lebanon.

Gunmen Reportedly Kidnap PSP Members in Khaldah

NC280916 Beirut Voice of Lebanon in Arabic
0815 GMT 28 May 87

[Text] Eyewitnesses in the Khaldah Triangle reported that masked gunmen set up checkpoints in the area and kidnapped some PSP members a short while ago.

Syrians Deny Kidnappings

NC281108 Beirut Voice of National Resistance in Arabic 1015 GMT 28 May 87

[Text] An official source at the Syrian Arab Forces Command Headquarters in Beirut has denied the story reported by some media that masked gunmen kidnapped people in the Khaldah Triangle this morning. The source described the news as totally untrue, saying there was no disruption of security in any area where the Syrians are deployed.

Al-Biqa' Villages Searched; 'Gunmen,' SLA Clash

NC281448 Beirut Voice of Lebanon in Arabic
1415 GMT 28 May 87

[Excerpts] According to reports from western Al-Biqa', four Merkava tanks and four armored personnel carriers entered the villages of Qilya and Al-Dallaqah at 0915 today, taking up positions on the approaches to the towns. Forces from the vehicles carried out storming operations and searched homes in the two villages, withdrawing at 1200. [passage omitted]

Skirmishes involving the use of machineguns and rockets have been reported in Lib'a, Kafr Falus, and 'Ayn al-Mir between South Lebanese Army [SLA] forces and opposing gunmen.

Skirmishes Among Amal Elements in Al-Awza'i Noted

NC281336 (Clandestine) Radio Free Lebanon in Arabic
1045 GMT 28 May 87

[Text] The Al-Awza'i area was very tense at noon today. This was the result of alerts and exchanges of machinegun fire among Amal Movement members from the Al-Miqdad, Al-Masri, and Hamiyyah families. These skirmishes reflect the struggle that erupted among the factions supporting Minister Nabih Birri and those backing 'Aqil Hamiyyha after the recent reorganization within the Amal Movement.

Rotenstreich-Tzur Committee Report Released
TA281435 Jerusalem GOVERNMENT PRESS OFFICE in English 27 May 87

["Report of the Rotenstreich-Tzur Committee on the Pollard Case; Communicated in English by the Prime Minister's Media Adviser" — GPO headline]

[Text] On the eleventh of Adar 5747, 12 March 1987, the prime minister appointed the following persons to serve as a two-member investigation commission into the Pollard case.

Following is the letter of appointment:

Jerusalem 11th Adar 5747
12th March 1987

To Advocate Dr Yehoshu'a Rotenstreich
Rav Aluf [Lieutenant General] (res) Tzvi Tzur

Letter of Appointment [Subhead]

A. On tenth Adar 5747 (3.11.87) the Cabinet decided to appoint a two-member investigation commission into the Pollard case.

B. In accordance with this decision I have the honor to appoint you with your consent, as an investigation commission into this subject. Dr Rotenstreich will serve as chairman of the commission.

C. In pursuit of your mission, you are authorized to receive any information both oral and written deemed necessary in your judgment concerning this case and from any person you think fit.

D. Your deliberations will be governed by the rules of secrecy pertaining to the preservation of the security of the state and its foreign relations.

E. I would be grateful if you were to present your report to the government through me, as soon as possible, including any recommendations you deem fit.

Yours sincerely,
Yitzhaq Shamir

The Report [Subhead]

Preamble

1. The commission held 35 sessions during which it interviewed 23 witnesses, several of whom were summoned several times to verify testimonies which had been given; in addition the commission held many meetings which were dedicated to internal discussions of its members. The commission also talked to various persons with a view to benefiting from information in their possession.

2. It should be emphasized that all the witnesses summoned by the commission appeared before it and, to the best of its knowledge, the testimonies given were complete. The commission examined many documents and received every document it requested.

3. Whereas the matters considered by the commission touch upon the security of the state, the commission recommends that the report as a whole be classified "top secret" and that only the following part be released to the public.

4. It should be recalled that several of those involved in this matter have been indicted in the U.S.A. whereas others are still subject to a process of annulling immunity granted to them. For this reason, and in order not to infringe upon the personal rights of those involved to protect their own interests, the commission has confined itself to this form of publishing its conclusions, and it asks the understanding of the public for this step it has taken.

Extract of the Conclusions of the Investigation Commission for the Pollard Case [Subhead]

5. The Pollard affair began in the first half of 1984 and ended towards the end of 1985.

6. At that time the "Office of Scientific Liaison" (hereafter LEKEM), the organ responsible for recruiting and running Pollard, was headed by Refa'el Eytan.

7. The ministers of defense during that period were Mr M. Arens (from 2.24.83 to 9.13.84) and Mr Y. Rabin (as of September 1984).

8. After the arrest of Pollard, government activity in the matter was concentrated in the hands of then prime minister (S. Peres), the vice prime minister and minister of foreign affairs (Y. Shamir) and the minister of defense (Y. Rabin).

9. The above three ministers appointed a professional team to handle contacts with U.S. authorities on the affair. The team reported to the same three ministers and acted on their instructions.

Refa'el Eytan [Subhead]

10. When Refa'el Eytan was appointed to his position as head of LEKEM, he already had a most commendable career in security affairs and a vast experience in the field of intelligence.

11. Notwithstanding his claim that a part of the modus operandi of LEKEM was not to his liking, he did not act sufficiently to change the situation.

12. In spite of the fact that he sometimes initiated meetings with the political level, he did not consult with the relevant ministers on the recruitment and running of Pollard.

13. There was no room for the recruitment and running of Pollard.

14. There is room for criticism of the way LEKEM was administered during that period. At the same time Refa'el Eytan served, for a part of the period, as adviser to the prime minister on terrorist affairs and also dealt with other matters.

15. In the circumstances, the decision to dissolve LEKEM was correct. Refa'el Eytan was removed from the defense establishment after many years of service. This is to be viewed as very severe punishment.

16. The ministers who appointed Refa'el Eytan as chairman of the board of directors of Israel Chemicals Ltd, following the dissolution of LEKEM and the release of Mr Eytan from the defense establishment, did not show adequate sensitivity concerning the reverberations that this appointment might generate against the background of the affair.

Colonel Avi'em Sela' [Subhead]

17. The conduct of Colonel Avi'em Sela' was not reasonable during certain stages of the Pollard affair. His entanglement was, in part, the result of an excessive initiative to be involved in the Pollard case.

18. The pressures brought to bear on the chief of the General Staff and the minister of defense to promote Colonel Sela' and to appoint him commander of Tel Nof base, appear to us, and this is an understatement, unjustified. His resignation from this post, in view of the criticism that this appointment engendered both in Israel and abroad, appears to us to have been correct.

Responsibility of the Political Level During the Period Pollard Was Run [Subhead]

19. Pollard was recruited and run during the tenure of Minister M. Arens as minister of defense and continued to be run during the tenure of minister Y. Rabin as minister of defense. The difference between the two is the length of their tenure during the period of the Pollard case.

20. The two above ministers knew neither of the recruitment and running of Pollard, nor of the place of his employment and, obviously they were not asked to approve his recruitment.

21. The oversight system of the Ministry of Defense over LEKEM operated in a most partial manner, and did not monitor its activities closely.

22. Periodic checks and reassessments of the targets of the tasks and of operational policy of LEKEM were not carried out.

Responsibility of the Political Level For Handling the Pollard Affair Following His Arrest [Subhead]

23. The prime minister (S. Peres), the vice prime minister and minister of foreign affairs (Y. Shamir) and the minister of defense (Y. Rabin) acted in this manner as a united team which decided jointly on all lines of action.

24. The political level did not make a sufficient report to determine the necessary facts, in order that they might serve as a basis for decisions taken which were pertinent to the matter.

25. However, the decision in itself, which was taken at that time, to cooperate with U.S. authorities in investigating the case, appears to us as reasonable.

26. The professional team which was entrusted with dealing with the issue, questioned a part of those involved but did not consider that it was charged with the task of carrying out a complete debrief of the affair.

27. It is for this reason that, within the framework of the agreement reached on this matter, the team passed incomplete facts (for lack of sufficient information) to the U.S. authorities and thus damaged our credibility.

28. The criticism we have concerning the three ministers lies in the fact that they did not take sufficient care to determine the facts before they were passed on to the U.S. authorities.

29. However, it should be emphasized that this was the result of pressure of time, the shock of the affair, and the utter surprise with which it caught the political level, coupled with the sincere desire to cooperate with U.S. authorities within understandable security constraints.

Conclusions [Subhead]

30. The responsibility of the ministers of defense during the period Pollard was run is responsibility for the commission or omission of their subordinates and for the non-construction of an effective oversight system to monitor LEKEM. The responsibility of the ministers after the arrest is direct responsibility for determining the method of dealing with the affair.

31. In our system the whole government as one body bears responsibility before the Knesset. Whereas every one of the ministers who is charged with a ministry performs a specific function, from the point of view of membership in the government and parliamentary responsibility, every minister is an inseparable part of the overall body which is the government.

32. The government as a whole and every one of the ministers is duty-bound to ascertain that the appropriate conclusions stemming from this report are drawn and that the failures mentioned in it do not reoccur.

33. In our opinion the government as a whole should assume responsibility for the failures mentioned in the report which we have presented, and should announce this in public.

Report Annex Places Ministerial Responsibility

TA282046 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 2000 GMT 28 May 87

[Text] Dr Yehoshu'a Rotenstreich, the head of the fact-finding committee which investigated the Pollard affair, discloses that an annex to the committee's report talks of ministerial responsibility and not only of collective responsibility. In his opinion, it is desirable that the government publish this annex since it does not contain any classified material. When this annex is published, Dr Rotenstreich said, all will realize that there is no whitewashing in the report, but rather a statement of clear, unequivocal facts.

As for the criticism Knesset Member Abba Eban leveled at the fact-finding committee's report, Dr Rotenstreich said that he greatly appreciates Abba Eban and that Eban is entitled to disagree with him. However, Rotenstreich added, he was afraid Eban did not read the annex attached to his committee's report which contains elements common to those in Eban's report. An ITIM correspondent says Dr Rotenstreich said this this evening upon returning from Switzerland.

Government Releases Eban Committee Report
TA281555 Jerusalem GOVERNMENT PRESS OFFICE in English 27 May 87

["Report of the Subcommittee of the Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee on Intelligence and Security Services Regarding Jonathan Pollard; Communicated by the Knesset's Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee; released on 26 May 87 at the Knesset" — GPO Headline]

[Text] Part I [Subhead]

[GPO] Editor's Note: The following sections of the report deal specifically with individuals. The page numbers refer to the location of each section in the original report.

Defense Minister Moshe Arens (p.14) [Subhead]

Moshe Arens was minister of defense when Pollard began to transfer information. Minister Arens admitted and maintained that he had exercised no supervision over (Rafi) Eytan, as he was preoccupied with the Lebanon war, that Eytan's involvement in intelligence had come as a surprise to him, that his many meetings with Eytan were devoted to the topic of Shi'ite terrorism, that he had not been briefed on the Scientific Liaison Unit (SLU) when he took over as defense minister, and that the period of overlap between his tenure as defense minister and the Pollard operation had been extremely brief.

Rafi Eytan has a different version. According to him, precisely in August, shortly before handing the ministry over to Yitzhaq Rabin, Arens had heard reports from him (Eytan) which should have led him to increase his alertness.

We believe that the implication is that he did not fulfill imperatives of ministerial responsibility and that responsibility devolves upon him because of this fact.

Yitzhaq Rabin (p. 15) [Subhead]

Yitzhaq Rabin assumed the post of defense minister in September 1984. He served in the post for 14 months of the Pollard affair, so that he had ample opportunity to take note of phenomena which should have caused him concern. For during that period, particularly sensitive intelligence material arrived at a growing pace. Had Rabin exercised appropriate supervision over the activity of the SLU, he would of necessity have noted the grave significance of this material.

Nevertheless, Rabin evinced no effort to maintain procedures of scrutiny or to tighten control, as he was duty-bound to do. During his term of office, the Pollard affair became a protracted phenomenon without Rabin being aware that the source was Pollard.

These data undoubtedly suggest that his salient personal duty was to exercise proper supervisory means which would have enabled him to know about the running of Pollard and to take the required measures vis-a-vis the operation.

The burden of ministerial responsibility devolving on him is beyond any doubt.

Responsibility of the Political Echelon — After Pollard's Fall (p. 26) [Subhead]

Prime Minister Shim'on Peres, Vice Premier Yitzhaq Shamir, and Defense Minister Yitzhaq Rabin testified before us that the decisions taken in the period following Pollard's exposure (from 11.22.85 and thereafter) were taken with the concurrence of all three of them.

Hence it follows that the three of them share responsibility for these decisions.

Under the parliamentary system that exists in Israel, the status of the prime minister is as first among equals.

Since Shim'on Peres was the head of the team that dealt with the affair, his parliamentary responsibility is preponderant.

Rafi Eytan (p.8) [Subhead]

1. Rafi Eytan bears full and direct responsibility for the decision to recruit and run Pollard. He did not report this to his superiors, and thus received no approval therefor. He was duty-bound to have understood that an action such as this was liable to imperil important interests of Israel, and to damage the friendly relations between Israel and the United States.

2. Rafi Eytan served the state for many years with unbounded loyalty and unfaltering commitment, chalking up to his credit accomplishments in a range of tasks, which contributed to the country's security.

3. The opinion was expressed in the committee that the very fact of Rafi Eytan's appointment to head the SLU was in the nature of a mistake, casting heavy responsibility on the minister in question, Ari'el Sharon. Eytan was given the dual position of heading the SLU — which is responsible to the Defense Ministry — and adviser in the war against terrorism, who is responsible to the prime minister.

In this view, an arrangement such as this was practically an invitation to inefficiency and for the danger that the holder of the two positions could easily evade supervision, due to his divided responsibility to two authorities.

With all due weight given to this consideration, a majority of the committee viewed the mistake of the appointment as wisdom after the fact. The majority opinion was that given the circumstance of time, and based on the situation which presented

itself at the time of the appointment, Eytan's appointment was considered to be natural in view of his abilities.

4. On the subject of Pollard, he did not evince wisdom, and even demonstrated injudiciousness, which caused the State of Israel numerous difficulties and harmed Israel-U.S. relations and relations with American Jewry.

Rafi Eytan was punished in that he was removed from his post as head of the SLU and was barred from engaging further in intelligence matters.

Avi'em Sela' (p.11) [Subhead]

1. Colonel Avi'em Sela' did not act judiciously as we would have expected of an experienced and high-ranking Israel Air Force officer such as him. Even if he believed — as he did — that he was doing loyal service to the country, common sense should have convinced him not to take part in work in which he lacked expertise.

2. In his appearances before this committee, Col Sela' was neither clear, consistent nor precise.

3. With this, it is incumbent upon us to recall that Col Sela', an outstanding pilot and exceptional commander, was personally punished in a harsh manner. It is doubtful whether he will receive his doctorate from New York University, since he can no longer return to the U.S.; he did not get the Air Force promotion he was supposed to get; he was forced to resign his control of the Tel Nof base; a large question mark hangs over the future of his career in the Air Force.

The Approvals Given for Sela"s Involvement (p.12) [Subhead]

The IAF commander and the former chief of staff applied faulty judgment in this affair. They acceded to Col Avi'em Sela"s request without carrying out a comprehensive check of their own so as to verify that a senior officer was not being used for a mission that would exceed his domain of command.

Approval should not be given for using a career-army officer within an intelligence framework outside the IDF, without the advance permission of the defense minister. It is to be regretted that former Chief of Staff Moshe Levi did not act accordingly in this affair.

We take note with satisfaction of the defense minister's announcement on the subject of utilizing army officers.

Part II. What Did the Political Echelon Know? (p.6) [Subhead]

When Pollard's arrest was reported, Prime Minister Shim'on Peres announced that in question is an operation which was carried out without the knowledge or approval of the political echelon. This was conveyed to U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz in an official and binding manner in a telephone conversation between Shultz and Peres which took place on the night between 30 November and 1 December 1985. A communique along these lines was also issued to the press.

The question whether the political echelon knew about Pollard's handling is such a significant point as far as national credibility and international ramifications are concerned, that we went to great lengths in order to clarify it completely. We did not hesitate to question all those who were capable of shedding light on the possibility that the political echelon did know, if such a possibility existed. We did not ignore the fact that some persons who appeared before the subcommittee would have personally benefited, by the nature of things, had it been possible to pin direct responsibility for their knowledge of the situation on one or more Cabinet members.

The clarification of this matter which we conducted led to the following conclusion which the committee accepted: The sum total of the evidence brought before the committee by all the witnesses concerned confirms beyond all doubt the conclusion that the operational echelons (namely: the Scientific Liaison Unit headed by Rafi Eytan) decided to recruit and handle Pollard without any check or consultation with the political echelon or receiving its direct or indirect approval.

The committee heard the contention that in intelligence operations of a certain kind it is best not to inform the responsible political echelon about exact details, the nature of the sources and the description of operations, and that it is preferable that the persons in the field refrain from requesting approval in advance from the political echelon for recruiting sensitive sources.

The committee rejects this stand as a rule. Although the head of an intelligence branch has discretionary power in exercising his authority, even in sensitive cases, as a rule he must report to the responsible political echelon in charge and/or to ask for its approval, since otherwise this echelon will be deprived of the capability to fulfill its duty of efficient supervision and of the possibility to prevent certain operations.

Rogue Operation or State Responsibility? (p.7) [Subhead]

Following Pollard's exposure, the Israel Government announced that in question was an operation carried out without the approval or knowledge of the political echelon. Subsequently, the operation was described as a "rogue operation," carried out privately by unauthorized persons.

The statement about the political echelon not knowing and not granting its approval is correct, whereas the description of the operation as "rogue" is baseless.

It is incontrovertible fact that the decision to handle Pollard as he was handled, as well as all the stages of implementation extending across a year and a half, were carried out by civil servants who received their appointments and drew their authority from the government, and more precisely, from Israel's defense establishment. All the actions of the operational personnel and the sums transferred to Pollard himself, derived from state resources without the approval or knowledge of the political echelon.

That the political echelon did not know and did not grant approval cannot annul the responsibility of the Israel Government in the situation which was created.

The assertion that the political echelon did not know is true, but it does not solve the problem of the national and ministerial responsibility deriving from the involvement of official personnel subordinate to the political echelon. The principle "noblesse oblige" is not satisfied if a rule is laid down that in every blunder or hitch only civil servants shall be subject to invigilation, while the responsible persons in the political echelon abandon them in the field.

The government has already implicitly recognized its responsibility: a) by undertaking to correct the situation; b) by undertaking to dismantle the unit which exceeded its authority; c)by pledging to call those responsible to order; d) by publishing the defense minister's apology on behalf of the government.

Despite the absense of any ministerial knowledge or approval for the operation, the government would do well to state unequivocally that Israel admits its responsibility and will continue to act to correct the damage, since some of its officials were involved in this operation.

Part III. The Decision on Cooperation With the United States (p.19) [Subhead]

On the night between 30 November and 1 December (1985), at 0330 hours, the U.S. secretary of state phoned Israel's Prime Minister Shim'on Peres. In this talk the two discussed the nature of the cooperation between Israel and the U.S. in this affair.

The committee members are divided as to the significance of some of the commitments pertaining to this cooperation.

Stand of Committee Members Eban, Dinitz and Harish [Subhead]

The report about the exposure and arrest of Jonathan Pollard confronted the Government of Israel with a highly distressful situation. The impression was created that Israel had behaved towards the friendliest power ever known by the Jewish people in a manner incommensurate with the tradition of friendship, and with the values and interests shared by the two peoples. Apart from the bitterness and sadness which were reflected in the administration's stand, a media campaign extremely hostile to Israel developed. The prime minister and the vice premier held urgent consultations which were joined by the defense minister immediately upon his return to Israel from abroad. The three personages explained to the Inner Cabinet, to the public on many occasions, and to this committee, that they view themselves as the members of a team all of whom share responsibility for all the decisions taken; they did not make any objection or put forward any reservation about any of (those decisions). Our perusal of their statements before this committee turns up not a single crack or impediment in the approach or strategy they recommended.

The urgency of the pressure exerted by the U.S. to clarify the matter, together with salient indications that the political echelon in the U.S. sincerely wished to contain and extinguish the blaze, compelled the three ministers to turn their attention urgently to the American front. To that end a committee of examination was established (Avraham Shalom, Hanan Bar-On and lawyer Ram Kaspi) to clarify and deal with the problems created with the U.S.

Beginning on 22 April (sic) internal consultations and exchanges of messages took place with the secretary of state in an effort to calm the administration and reach cooperation. A key milestone in the evolution of the Israeli strategy was a conversation held in the early morning hours (30 November-1 December) when Secretary of State Shultz phoned Prime Minister Peres. In this talk the prime minister clarified the following points to Mr Shultz:
a) Pollard was an aberrant situation, the political echelon was unaware of the matter, an unauthorized initiative had taken place without any official approval whatsoever; b) Israel undertakes full cooperation; c)Israel will allow free access to the Israelis involved; d) Israel will punish those responsible; e) the unit whose personnel involved themselves in the operation will be disbanded; f) Israel will return documents it received via Pollard.

These commitments were not unreserved. The prime minister requested that the interpretation to be placed on his undertakings be discussed between Hanan Bar-On, on behalf of Israel, and Under- Secretary of State Armacost on behalf of the United States.

Yitzhaq Shamir, who was then vice premier and foreign minister, informed us regarding the conversation that "there were consultations. It was clear that we were going to full cooperation in order to conclude the episode."

To the committee members' question about where it had been decided to return the documents and allow testimonies, Shamir replied that "this was spoken about in the meetings...Mr Peres spoke with the secretary of state about returning documents because they maintained this was American property. There was also talk about questioning Israelis, but this was also spoken of earlier. It was not something that popped into Peres' mind during the conversation."

The three ministers were and remain in agreement in giving backing to what Mr Peres told Mr Shultz in their phone conversation and in all decisions taken in the matter.

Our view is that the decision taken was the right decision, and that there was place for the phone conversation with Mr Shultz. After all, in Mr. Peres' eyes, Mr Shultz was — and justly so — not only the foreign minister of the country that was harmed, but was also a friend of Israel's seeking to extricate the relations of the two countries from the distress afflicting them. Moreover, the two ministers did not give Shultz an open-ended pledge. They put forward restrictions and reservations, making their activity contingent upon the protection of Israel's security and intelligence interests. They also placed restrictions on the place and form of the questioning. Furthermore, the three ministers made the cooperation contingent upon the granting of immunity to the three persons involved in the affair, and upon American agreement that the returned documents would not be used to convict Pollard.

These moves prevented a debacle and forged tight cooperation with Secretary of State Shultz. The senior political echelon in the U.S. reacted positively to the conversation with Mr Peres and to the messages that followed in its wake. Mr Peres and Mr Shamir received messages from Mr Shultz which were steeped in esteem and exuded friendship, evincing a desire on his part to contain the affair. There were grounds for believing that the tension was dissipating and that relations with the U.S. would (again be) smooth. It is difficult to describe as a blunder a diplomatic move which was crowned with this degree of success. The alternative to this policy would have generated a serious setback in relations between Israel and the U.S. with all that this entails. It would have generated an extreme and furious reaction by all the elements of American society, would have thrust Israel into a confrontation with Secretary of State Shultz and thereby with the White House as well. The result would have been reactions against Israel both among public opinion and in the Congress.

A few months later the situation again became embroiled, but the factors that caused this did not derive from the decision taken by the prime minister, vice premier, and defense minister to cooperate, or from the actual commitment which Mr Peres made to Mr Shultz. This aggravation did not stem from a strategy which the government adopted at the outset of the crisis. Its source lay in a mistake made by the committee of examination, which did not succeed in putting the entire picture before the political echelon, including the part of Col Avi'em Sela' in the affair, as well as several tactical and informational mistakes.

The foundations of the alliance with the United States are firm and deep, and Israel's policy of cooperation prevented harm being done to the central components of the friendhsip which the government and people of the United States feel for Israel.

Stand of Committee Members Ben-Elisar, Olmert and Magen: [Subhead]

On the night between 30 November and 1 December 1985, at 0330 hours, Secretary of State Shultz phoned Prime Minister Shim'on Peres. During their conversation Mr Peres agreed to spell out Israel's modes of cooperation with the U.S. in the affair. At the conclusion of the conversation, Mr Peres gave undertakings in a number of subjects:

1. The Israelis involved in the affair would be questioned by a representative of the U.S. Government.

2. The Pollard documents would be returned to the U.S.

3. The Scientific Liaison Unit would be disbanded and its personnel dismissed.

4. Disciplinary measures would be taken against those responsible for the affair.

There is no doubt that it was the duty of the Israel Government to propose immediate cooperation with the U.S. Government in the wake of Pollard's exposure, in addition to a full and unequivocal apology. The circumstances of Pollard's exposure, the justified American outrage, the fear of a serious blow to Israel-U.S. relations: all these justified an approach of cooperation on this subject. The question is what should have been the manner and scope of the cooperation Israel should have proposed. Prime Minister Shim'on Peres's agreement to return the documents which had been brought by Pollard, was fundamentally wrong and caused extremely serious damage. These documents constituted the basis which led to Pollard's conviction and the life sentence imposed on him, and this despite an Israeli contention that an American commitment existed not to use them against Pollard. The incomplete ability to live up to the undertaking to return the documents caused a crisis of confidence between the U.S. and Israel.

The prime minister did not heed the advice of those who were dealing with the matter on his behalf, who believed that it was not possible to return these documents.

The decision to return the documents was not preceded by any discussion within the framework of the ministerial team or in any other forum. We found no minutes of any advance consultation, meeting, discussion or even telephone conversation in which this move was agreed on.

On the day following the conversation, the prime minister reported it to the ministerial team, and they assented to it. The ministers' assent to the prime minister's decision was a mistake, even though in the circumstances, after Mr Peres had given an undertaking to Mr Shultz, this could not be retracted without causing even greater damage. We do not accept the contention that an undertaking to return to documents was unavoidable. The cooperation with the U.S. was vital and involved also other channels of activity. Had Shim'on Peres directed that a proper investigation be conducted, as he was obliged to do, he undoubtedly would have refrained from proposing that the documents be returned, and perhaps even have refused to permit the questioning of the Israelis involved in the affair. But Mr Peres refrained from ordering an investigation or examining the requisite details, thereby becoming entangled in an undertaking he should never have given.

Part IV. The Operational and the Supervisory Echelons (p.13) [Subhead]

Although the ministerial responsibility for supervision and control is vested in the hands of ministers and is not transferable, it is natural that official personnel be entrusted with the task of supervision. A committee was in fact set up in the Defense Ministry to supervise the activity of the Scientific Liaison Unit. It emerged beyond all doubt that this supervision was not carried out in practice. Those responsible for the monitoring did not guide the SLU by means of questions or warnings, and did not make sure to report to their own superiors in the political echelon.

During the period in which the Pollard operation was underway the central responsibility for the supervision was borne by Defense Ministry Director General Menahem Meron. The director general carried out no scrutiny supervision beyond the administrative area.

This could not have been the intention of the ministers who set up the monitoring committee and placed the director general at its head.

In his appearance before the subcommittee, he tried to belittle the importance of his responsibility and at times did not even remember or preferred not to remember his involvement in matters relating to the SLU.

Additional Developments (pp. 24-25) [Subhead]

1. The prime minister, with the full agreement of the vice premier and the defense minister, appointed an examination team but did not initiate a thorough investigation which would clarify all the precise details of the episode. For a lengthy period considerable confusion prevailed, as a result of which Israeli figures at all levels came out with divergent statements, in various forms and in a variety of styles, both to each other and to foreign elements. Again the credibility of the Israelis was harmed — and this was and remains the central problem in Israel's struggle to restore its standing. True, it was justified to grant priority to dialogue with the U.S., but at the same time and at any rate immediately afterwards, duty dictated consolidating a correct, true and convincing version on the circumstances of Israel's involvement.

2. Instead, a completely baseless story was disseminated among U.S. Administration circles, which was incapable of convincing anyone anywhere.

3. An Israeli delegation left for the U.S. and returned five days later. During this time conflicting and confusing versions of Israeli elements continued to appear.

4. A meeting took place at the country club with an American delegation headed by Judge Sofaer. One of the serious mistakes made by the examination team at this meeting was to conceal the role of Avi'em Sela' as an important figure in the development of the episode, this without the knowledge of the political echelon. When this deception was revealed, the Americans were furious.

5. The U.S. Administation, and particularly the friendly elements in it, attributed great importance to Israel's undertaking "to punish the culprits." Here the American interest focused on two persons: on Rafi Eytan and at a later stage on Avi'em Sela'. Rafi Eytan was appointed director of the largest economic enterprise in Israel, with the Americans expressing their protest.

6. Several months ago great publicity was given to the intention to promote Col Sela' both in rank and in post. This step caused bitterness among the American people and the American public was vociferously outraged. By adding insult to injury and despite the red light set off by the American ambassador in his talks in Jerusalem, a statement was issued on the appointment of Col Avi'em Sela' as commander of the Tel Nof base. Meanwhile Col Avi'em Sela' resigned from his post as Tel Nof commander. His resignation calmed the stormy situation.

We express our satisfaction with Sela"s resignation from his post, but we cannot ignore the mistake of Defense Minister Rabin in appointing him under these circumstances.

Part V. Shim'on Peres' Appearance Before the Subcommittee on Intelligence and Secret Services on 11.28.85, and His Remarks to the Inner Cabinet That Day (p.29) [subhead]

On 11.28.85 Prime Minister Shim'on Peres appeared before this committee. The committee members are divided as to the essence of Mr. Peres' report.

Stand of MK's [Members of Knesset] Ben-Elisar, Olmert and Magen: [Subhead]

The committee devoted considerable time to discussing the appearance of Prime Minister Shim'on Peres before it on 11.28.85, in the wake of Pollard's exposure.

At that session Mr Peres reported on the circumstances surrounding Pollard's recruitment to the Scientific Liaison Unit (SLU). According to Mr Peres' version, Pollard approached Israel on his own initiative and explained that he was a representative of American Intelligence. He showed appropriate documents to verify this. Already in the session on 11.28.85 MK Eliyahu Ben-Elisar expressed great doubt about the probability of this version.

Nevertheless, this version was also related to the Inner Cabinet in its meeting that same day. Earlier, at 2300 hours the previous evening, Mr Peres conveyed a message to Secretary of State Shultz containing this version.

Patently, if Pollard actually approached Israel from the outset, presenting himself as a representative of American Intelligence who was acting via unofficial channels, then his activity in Israel's service does not cast on us the same degree of responsibility as would be the case if Israel had recruited him as a full-fledged spy.

It goes without saying that it was important to use this version in order to lighten somewhat the difficulties we faced. However, this version is of course fanciful, [illegible] devoid of any chance of succeeding, since Mr [illegible] himself as a representative of American [illegible] did not present his papers as proof of this claim.

Circumstances of the Origin of This Version: [Subhead]

Immediately after the Pollard affair began to unravel, it became clear to various elements that there was a need to crystallize an Israeli version which would reduce to a minimum the damage that had been and would be caused.

Mr Peres maintained that already on 11.28.85, in a meeting that took place in his office follwing Pollard's exposure, he was given an incorrect report to the effect that Pollard had stated on his own initiative, that he was a representative of American Intelligence. When asked, Prime Minister Peres replied that when the report was made Rafi Eytan was sitting in his room and he (Peres) even confirmed these details.

Mr Peres maintained that at no stage did he hear any other [last word printed in boldface] description of the events, and he explained the incorrect report to the Knesset committee by saying that he himself was convinced that this was a true account of the affair.

The possibility that Mr Peres on 11.22.85 heard the version about Pollard's volunteering as though it were truthful, is extremely poor, for the simple reason that this version had its genesis three days later. It is impossible that on 11.22.85 Mr Peres heard a version that was not in existence.

Mr Peres maintains that Rafi Eytan took part in the meeting at which he was given the misleading report. Eytan's presence in fact reinforces precisely a version opposite to that of Peres's.

Immediately [last word printed in boldface] Pollard was exposed, Eytan stated that he assumed full responsibility for the affair. [sentence as received] He emphasized and reemphasized that no political level had known details relating to Pollard personally.

Under these circumstances, what reason could Eytan have had to mislead the political echelon in a matter which could be of no benefit to himself?

Moreover, Eytan on 11.27.85 submitted a document containing an Israeli version. It is beyond understanding why Eytan would prepare such a document while at the same time lending a hand to the dissemination of a story which would mislead the political level, while he was simultaneously making every effort to cooperate and even to assume responsibility personally.

The version which holds that Mr Peres was misled in this matter appears totally unreasonable. Mr Peres could and should have known exactly what had occurred and under what circumstances Pollard had been recruited to the SLU, and to the best of our impression, on [sentence printed in boldface] 11.28.85 he indeed should have known this. (Emphasis here and elsewhere in the original — GPO).

Several committee members asked why Mr Peres would want to relate such a crude version which could so easily be refuted.

On the surface this question sounds reasonable. Actually, it is not. Mr Peres did not in the least pretend to claim that Israel could and should reveal all the details of the story to the Americans, and indeed there is no doubt that it was essential to crystallize a reasonable, albeit partial, version.

The question was: Which version should be conveyed to Shultz? Mr Peres gave him the only version that was brought to his knowledge. That fact that this version was refuted does not attest to the fact that Mr Peres did not know it was a fabricated story. It is only proof that it was an unsuccessful invention.

One could forgive Mr Peres the use of this story which had no prospect of succeeding, had he not sought to present it as a truthful story to the members of the Knesset committee.

What is the reason that Mr Peres stumbled in speaking untruth to the Knesset committee? Various explanations could be adduced, but it is not our business to analyse Mr Peres's motivation in this matter.

Ultimately, there is no doubt that Mr Peres misled the Knesset committee and provided it with a report which was not true.

In his defense, it will be recalled, Mr Peres maintained that on 11.28.85 he did not yet know the truth, hence he erred in good faith.

We would very much like to believe this contention because of the great respect we hold for Mr Peres and his high position.

If Peres's contention is correct that on 11.28.85 he did not yet know the truth, then a very grave question arises regarding the nature of his functioning as prime minister — if a week after Pollard's exposure Peres did not know the details of the episode.

One way or the other, Mr Peres could and was duty-bound [last two words printed in boldface] to know the details. That he did not know them at this stage, in these circumstances, and while he was in contact with international elements (and) gave an incorrect report to the Knesset — all this speaks for itself.

Stand of MK's Eban, Dinitz and Harish [Subhead]

We firmly reject the allegation that Shim'on Peres ostensibly, knowingly provided incorrect information in a certain portion of his report during his appearance before the subcommittee on services on 11.28.85. We have full trust in the version of Shim'on Peres, according to which he conveyed the things as they were known to him at that time in the belief that they were true.

Because of the security sensitivity of these matters, we cannot detail all the data on which we base our stand. But two facts which can be published are sufficient to refute the allegation being made against Shim'on Peres:

1. On the same day that Shim'on Peres appeared before the subcommittee on services, 11.28.85, he also appeared before the Inner Cabinet and there read out the contents of a document containing the same information which Shim'on Peres had given earlier to the subcommittee. And at the conclusion of that passage Shim'on Peres said, according to the Inner Cabinet minutes: "What we wrote here is the truth."

2. The mistaken information reached Shim'on Peres from a document which is in the possession of the subcommittee, and which was definitely liable to prove misleading! MK Ben-Elisar himself acknowledged this in a discussion of the subcommittee on services on 3.27.87.

It is important to note that the difference between what Shim'on Peres knew and reported that day to the subcommittee, and the information which he found was correct afterward, had no influence whatsoever on the committee's findings or conclusions, beyond the debate which arose on this specific point.

We regret the decision of Knesset members to publish statements of condemnation against a citizen and public figure which are clearly — and without justification — aimed at harming his honor and his good name.

Part VI. Introduction (p 3). [subhead]

1. The Knesset regulations (4.(a).12) empower the Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee to discuss "the state's foreign policy,

armed forces and security." In 1982, at the initiative of the then-chairman of the committee (Moshe Arens), a number of subcommittees of limited composition were established in order to discuss in greater detail and depth sensitive topics which are within the committee's purview.

The subcommittee holds comprehensive and thorough discussions with the intelligence services. In Israel the principle of parliamentary oversight of the functioning of the intelligence establishments is maintained thanks to the work of this subcommittee. The subcommittee does not deal with operations, but it does take an interest in central situations and problems, provides counsel in the political spheres, and approves, on behalf of the Knesset, the provision of the required resources for the functioning of the establishments.

2. From the outset the prime minister thought — in appearing before the committee — that there was no place to conduct an investigation on the topic of Jonathan Pollard. Committee Chairman Abba Eban stated that concern for orderly administration, together with considerations of foreign policy, obligate the subcommittee to clarify the subject in all its aspects. On the same day Knesset Speaker MK Shlomo Hilel announced that he supports the realization of the Knesset's responsibility in this sphere, as in all spheres of the government's functioning.

3. On 11 March 1987 the Inner Cabinet issued a statement on its decision to establish an investigation committee into the Pollard case and to assist the subcommittee of the Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee in its work. This decision generated positive reactions in Israel and the world. Publication of the announcement concerning the commencement of the clarification by the Knesset subcommittee led to a considerable moderation in the stand of governmental and media elements in the U.S. vis-a-vis Israel. But the main emphasis in our activity originates in the national duty to contribute to the enhancement and improvement in the functioning of the establishments which we deal with. This includes spotting and examining hitches, to ensure their non-recurrence.

4. The work of the subcommittee began with a detailed report from Defense Minister Yitzhaq Rabin on 12 March 1987. We note with satisfaction that the government's pledge to assist the subcommittee was realized with all seriousness and thoroughness. All the ministers, officers and civil servants past and present appeared before us — some at their own initiative. All the documents we requested were provided, including the minutes of Cabinet and Inner Cabinet meetings.

5. The subcommittee has standing responsibility which exceeds the sphere of the Pollard case. Therefore it took advantage of the appearance of the ministers and the other interviewees in order to deepen its examination of the intelligence community. No country grants publicity to intelligence establishments and methods. Thus, most of the material which accumulated in the hands of the subcommittee for this clarification will be placed at the exclusive [last word printed in boldface] disposal of the ministers and security personnel whose responsibility relates to the subject under discussion. This report is no more than a miniscule portion of the comprehensive material that we accumulated. It refers to topics in which the Knesset and public have a special interest and which can be published with security limitations. The full and secret report will be submitted to the perusal of those concerned.

6. The subcommittee does not have the status of a judicial institution, hence it does not follow procedures such as are customary in legal investigations. Thus the subcommittee does not intend to pass judgment in terms of personal conclusions which are liable to follow from its findings and evaluations. This stand is accepted by all the members of the subcommittee, and this report is worded accordingly. On the other hand, the subcommittee does reserve the right to express assessments and impressions, and to summarize the findings and conclusions, as is customary in proper parliamentary life.

7. It is the way of the world that a hitch which is revealed in an intelligence establishment has powerful reverberations, while intelligence successes are wrapped in silence. This report concerns a very serious hitch. The criticism levelled at a certain operation, which would have been better never to have seen the light of day, does not indicate a disregard of the achievements of the intelligence services, which constitute an essential component in Israel's vital security system. The resourcefulness, daring, and very often the heroism and sacrifice of the upholders of the intelligence missions are known and open before us. These services can take pride in their accomplishments and the results of their efforts, and the State of Israel owes them a debt of esteem and appreciation.

What the Report Deals With (p 5) [subhead]

8. This report concerns itself with the considerations, operations and decisionmaking procedures of the Cabinet ministers, civil servants and officers who were involved to one degree or another in situations that were created as a result of the employment of Jonathan Pollard. The first period to which this report applies began at the end of May 1984, when Pollard succeeded for the first time, at his initiative, in making contact with an officer in the Israel Air Force [IAF], Col Avi'em Sela'. From that time on, Israelis continued to maintain a connection with Pollard in the U.S., Israel and France until his arrest by the U.S. authorities on 19 November 1985. Throughout this period Pollard was run by Refa'el Eytan and his aides in the Scientific Liaison Unit.

9. The arrest, trial and sentencing of Pollard made this matter public knowledge and necessitated the involvement of the Cabinet and the Inner Cabinet. The people of Israel were surprised and appalled when they learned the details of an espionage operation executed by Israelis — civil servants — which led to a crisis in relations between Israel and the U.S. It is here that the problem arises of the government's responsibility towards the Knesset and the public. In addition, in the sphere of relations between Israel and the U.S. worrisome tension prevailed which encompassed very broad circles among the sympathetic American public. The government was called on to work for the repair of one important strand in Israel's fabric of international ties.

Part VII. Reservations of MK David Magen (p.9) [subhead]

1. The public report of the committee referring to the degree of responsibility of the Scientific Liaison head, Mr Refa'el Eytan,

does injustice to the man, to the personnel of the unit he was in charge of, and to the entire matter.

By the nature of things, the committee was unable to specify in this report, due to its being published, numerous details which would have attested to the nature of the unit Eytan headed. The clear conclusion stemming from these details is that the recruitment of Pollard and his handling were done with authority, and committee members indeed agree that Refa'el Eytan did not exceed the authority invested in him.

This was the reason that following Pollard's exposure Prime Minister Shim'on Peres stated that "we do not want an investigation, because it will reveal things we already know." Following suit, Defense Minister Yitzhaq Rabin told the Inner Cabinet on 28 Novermber 1985: "There is no chopping of heads, nor will there be."

2. In the forty years of his work in the civil service, Rafi Eytan made a large and unique contribution. His brilliant achievements within the framework of his work in the various security branches were not and cannot be publicized, but it is a fact that all the committee members without exception have a personal appreciation for his tremendous contribution to Israel.

When Shim'on Peres became prime minister in the end of 1984, he saw to it — for incomprehensible and unclear reasons — that Eytan distanced himself from the Prime Minister's Office and someone else appointed in his place. Despite this injustice, Rafi Eytan did not leave the civil service and continued to invest all his efforts and talents in his work, which now shrank to activity in the Defense Ministry alone. During the period in which Mr Eytan headed the Scientific Liaison Unit, it reached the peak of its achievements. One of the security personnel who appeared before the committee expressed this as follows: "Until Rafi arrived we talked about a Scientific Liaison Unit, and since Rafi arrived we called the SLU — Rafi. The material Rafi Eytan was made of was more than once described by the highest echelon as 'priceless'."

3. In the first stages of Pollard's recruitment, Rafi Eytan understood the particular sensitivity of the issue and took the trouble to define the potential hazards of running Pollard in a detailed document. In the document, he issued instructions on special rules and caution. In retrospect, it emerges that Rafi Eytan's instructions were not fulfilled. His statement to the committee "I am willing to assume the responsibility" is not tantamount to the committee's agreement that he indeed bears all the responsibility. Rafi Eytan's attempt in his appearance before the committee to absolve of any mistake his superiors and the echelon subordinate to him, as well as others involved in the affair, deserves special appreciation as a gesture of friendship and fighters' comradeship but cannot lead the committee to the conclusion that the mistakes in the operation were those of Rafi Eytan and that all the responsibility devolves on him.

4. The claim that Rafi Eytan went too far in making use of the assistance of an IDF officer in an intelligence operation unconnected to the army is incorrect. It was established in the committee that Col Sela' aided the SLU only after Rafi Eytan approached the IAF, who, in a letter to Col Sela', gave approval for his cooperation with the SLU.

5. The critical period prior to Pollard's fall was the summer and fall of 1985. At the beginning of June 1985, Mr Eytan was taken to the hospital when he was suffering eye problems. On 3 October 1985 his sight returned and he returned to working part time. I assume that in regular conditions he would have succeeded in ascertaining that his orders to halt the link with Pollard were being fulfilled; he was prevented from carrying out this action due to his illness. Here it should be recalled that even with his return to work in October, his sight was still physically limited.

6. Immediately with the failure of the operation, Mr Eytan took pains to inform the prime minister that he was assuming responsibility. This personal sacrifice came within the framework of his viewing the matter as one of life and death, and in the hope that the mishap would not turn into a complicated and difficult affair. Since this condition was not fulfilled, and mistakes made by the political echelon turned the "mishap" into an "affair," there is no point in acceding to Eytan's request and agreeing (sic). Thus, there was and is no place for the formulation appearing in the report that there were Americans who doubt the severity of the punishment meted out to Rafi Eytan.

With the exposure of Pollard, Rafi Eytan's world was destroyed. He was dismissed from his post (at the demand of the Americans), and a brilliant security career was lopped off brutally and roughly. It is inconceivable that there was allegedly place to take note of a petition not to quickly appoint him to a senior economic position. Not even the biggest sinner is punished twice for the same sin. Despite his considerable success as the prime minsiter's adviser of terrorism, Mr Shim'on Peres saw to it that he was dismissed from this post immediately he assumed the office of prime minister. And as if this were not enough, and despite the binding statement of the defense minister against the backdrop of Pollard's exposure that "there is no chopping of heads, nor will there be," Prime Minister Shim'on Peres was quick to punish Rafi Eytan and only Eytan by dismissing him from his position as head of the SLU. The questions must be asked: What is the source of the lust of certain elements to see Rafi Eytan's head "chopped off" for a third time?

Reservation of MK's Dinitz and Harish (p.27) [Subhead]

We are of the opinion that following the sentence, "Hence it follows that the three of them share responsibility for these decisions" (see GPO translation, Part I, p.2. "Responsibility of the political echelon..."), the following sentence should be inserted: "The three acted as a team by virtue of the positions they held in the government as prime minister, vice premier and foreign minister, and defense minister, and they bear responsibility together before the Knesset for their decisions."

Reservation of MK David Magen (p.28) [Subhead]

As of November 1985, a forum composed of three ministers — the prime minister, the foreign minister and the defense minister — dealt with the affair. True, it was explained that the aspects of the Pollard affair relate to security and to the plane of the Foreign Ministry, hence the special composition (of the team).

However, from the moment the affair became a tangled international episode, standing at the head of the political agenda, it should have been dealt with in a regular government forum. If the government wished to forgo its powers and transfer them to a team composed of just three personages, it should have taken an explicit decision to this effect.

Reservations Relating to Sections Dealing With the Function and Responsibility of Moshe Arens and Yitzhaq Rabin in Their Capacity as Defense Ministers During the Pollard Operation — submitted by MK Mikha Harish (p.16) [Subhead]

Instead of the version approved by the committee, I wish to note the following:

1. Moshe Arens was minister of defense when Pollard began to transfer meaningful information, get briefings and funds, and embark on the course which led to the hitch that is the subject of this report. Minister Arens admitted and maintained that he had exercised no supervision over (Rafi) Eytan, as he was preoccupied with the Lebanon war, that Eytan's involvement in intelligence had come as a surprise to him, that his many meetings with Eytan were devoted to the topic of Shi'ite terrorism, that he had not been briefed on the Scientific Liaison Unit (SLU) when he took over as defense minister, and that his tenure as defense minister had been brief.

2. This version constitutes a confession of sorts that Moshe Arens did not fulfill imperiatives of ministerial responsibility with respect to Rafi Eytan and that responsibility should devolve on him because of this fact; the more so following Rafi Eytan's presentation of a picture entirely different from the one retained in Moshe Arens's memory. Rafi Eytan testified, on the basis of notes taken at the time, that he had spoken many times with Arens about topics that should have aroused the minister's curiosity and concern about the sources of the information and material he was receiving, and that expressly in August, a short time after transferring the ministry to Yitzhaq Rabin, Arens heard reports from Rafi Eytan which should have led to increased alertness.

3. The conclusion is that Minister of Defense Arens did nothing which could be interpreted as imposing supervision, or minimal authority, over the SLU, which was a Defense Ministry unit. It should be noted that Minister Arens was well versed in the professional matters handled by Rafi Eytan. His conclusion is that by any reasonable definition of the term "ministerial responsibility," responsibility should devolve on Minister Arens for that fateful period in 1984 when the Pollard affair began.

4. Moshe Arens's past and background should have led him to heed and be involved in SLU matters, on a scale exceeding that of all the defense ministers who preceded and followed him. Moshe Arens, who was familiar with the SLU due both to his personal and professional contacts and his public positions prior to his assumption of the defense portfolio, certainly knew that this was an organization dealing with delicate and problematic matters, necessitating control and scrutiny.

In view of the above, his responsibility is even graver considering the fact that Rafi Eytan fulfilled the role of SLU head only in a part-time capacity, and that he agreed in advance that the SLU be directed by a person whose main attention was concentrated on a different topic, at a time when the SLU did not receive the necessary direction and attention which call for the full energy, mental capacity and responsibility of the responsible person.

5. Yitzhaq Rabin "inherited" a situation in which neglect of the matters of the unit headed by Rafi Eytan had become something of a tradition. He served in the post for 14 months of the Pollard affair. This means that he had ample opportunity to take note of phenomena which should have caused him concern. It is undeniable that the minister's defense and political experience could have afforded him expertise and sensitivity vis-a-vis the activity of Rafi Eytan and the SLU.

6. On the face of it, there are oversight systems in the form of monitoring committees, but the ministry administration did not question Eytan as to the purpose of the administrative assistance that he requested. Actually, Rafi Eytan's subordination is nothing but a formal myth.

7. Notwithstanding, during Yitzhaq Rabin's term, Rafi Eytan ceased to serve as the adviser on terrorism and his sole duty was to direct the SLU. As a rule, we received testimonies demonstrating that Yitzhaq Rabin evinced greater sensitivity than his predecessor in the post, in all matters relating to supervision of the SLU, and it is regrettable that this sensitivity did not lead to more vigorous action which might have prevented in good time the damage incurred by the eruption of the Pollard affair, whose origins lie in Moshe Arens's term as minister of defense.

8. In accordance therewith, it must be asserted that Minister of Defense Yitzhaq Rabin did not fulfill the imperatives of ministerial responsibility regarding the supervision of Rafi Eytan and the SLU.

MK Simcha Dinitz' reservations Concerning the Section Dealing With Defense Minister Yitzhaq Rabin (p.18) [Subhead]

1. In the first paragraph, the following should be omitted: "This means that he had ample opportunity to take note of phenomena which should have caused him concern." And this because intelligence material was brought to the desk of all the defense ministers prior to and following this period, without any indication of the material's source.

2. The second paragraph should be omitted and the following inserted in its place: "Material was submitted to the committee indicating that the minister of defense actually evinced alertness and even called the attention of the SLU chief to the risks involved in its activity."

Rabin, Peres Blast Eban at Labor Meeting
TA281831 Jerusalem Domestic Service in English
1700 GMT 28 May 87

[Text] And now to the uproar at the Labor Party's Central Committee. Over to Sabra Chartrand:

Defense Minister Yitzhaq Rabin addressed the Central Committee first, tearing into Knesset Member [MK] Abba Eban for conducting what he called a purely political investigation into the Pollard affair. Rabin praised the Rotenstreich-Tzur committee, whose findings, he said, were clear and nonpolitical. There is a difference, Rabin said, directing his comments at Eban, between an objective committee and a political committee.

Abba Eban then took the podium and defended the results of his committee's investigation, amid shouts and protests from members of the Central Committee and, at one point, an outburst from Foreign Minister Shim'on Peres who was sitting in the first row, even insisting his decision to undertake an investigation into the Pollard affair was correct. Eban criticized the Central Committee for putting pressure on him in an effort to force him to renege on his stand. Eban declared he would not submit to internal party pressure, he would not express regret for his committee's actions, nor retreat from what his conscience dictated to be truth of the Pollard affair.

An incensed Shim'on Peres took the stage and blasted Eban for conducting what he called a melodramatic appeal to the party. What are you complaining about, Peres demanded of Eban; no one here is putting political pressure on you; no member of this party is asking anything of you, especially not that you deny your conscience. Pointing at Eban, Peres shouted: You were the misken, the poor victim, you were the miserable one. No one, Peres continued, is asking you to leave the party, only that you fulfill your post as you should. If you oppose the members of your own party, does it seem strange to you that they ask you to stop, Peres asked Eban. Peres then recited a list of government scandals, including the Pollard affair, the Shin Bet affair, recent high inflation, and the Lebanese war, which he said he bore no responsibility for, but nevertheless dealt with when he became prime minister. If we allow the Likud to place responsibility for these issues on us, Peres said, it will discredit the Labor Party, as well as myself.

Eban sat quietly throughout Peres' reprimand and then left the hall immediately after the meeting adjourned.

Arens Reacts to Pollard Committee Reports

TA281541 Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew
1400 GMT 28 May 87

[Text] Here is the first reaction from Minister Moshe Arens to the Pollard affair report. Today he said the first meetings with Jonathan Pollard took place about 2 months before he left the Defense Ministry, but the activation began about 2 months after he had left the post. Therefore, Arens said, he is not at all connected with the affair. Our correspondent Qobi Mandel heard him.

[Begin recording] [Mandel] Minister Moshe Arens is not prepared to say anything about the man who replaced him in his post, Defense Minister Yitzhaq Rabin, on anything linked with his responsibility in the Pollard affair. At the same time, Minister Arens recalls that he himself had no connection with the issue.

[Arens] From reading the report I learned that the first meetings with Pollard took place in July. That was 2 months before I left the Defense Ministry. And, that meeting in Paris, which was also reported in the paper [as heard], where his activation began, took place in November, which was 2 months after I left the Defense Ministry, so I had no connection with the issue, nor did I know anything about it.

[Mandel] More on the affair: Minister Arens thinks there is no longer any point in continuing to deal with it after the two committees have completed their work.

[Arens] Thorough work has been done by both committees and I assume that the conclusions are those of the committee members. As for calling them tepid, or hot, or cold conclusions, I do not see any point in these names. That is what they thought. They said unambiguously, in both committees, that the political echelons did not know about Pollard's recruitment or his activation. I knew this before, because I had not known and I also heard from Yitzhaq Shamir that he did not know. Also I had no doubts whatsoever that he was speaking the truth, but it is important that the committees examined this because, nevertheless, over the past few months we have heard all sorts of doubts that perhaps the political echelons did know. So I think it is most important that the two committees decided unequivocally that the political echelons did not know, had no connection with this, and I think this is something which will help to maintain good relations between Israel and the United States. [end recording]

Editorials Comment on Pollard Probe Reports

Morning Press

TA280915 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew
0330 GMT 28 May 87

[From the review of morning press editorials]

[Text] *Ha'aretz* says that anyone who takes a close look at the Eban Committee report cannot help but realize that Shamir, Peres, Arens, and Rabin must — unless the term ministerial responsibility is rendered meaningless — resign from the Cabinet. What we need now is for them to leave the political stage, not a Cabinet resolution that expresses nothing except support for people unworthy of such backing. The two large parties can easily find men to replace these four people once they resign. It would be advisable, though not absolutely necessary, that this essential personnel reshuffle result from new Knesset elections.

Davar writes that the Cabinet successfully managed to avoid disbanding over the Pollard affair, although the ongoing bickering among its two major blocs was evident even yesterday, as seen in the dispute between the Likud and Alignment members of the Eban committee. These disputes will continue to affect the ministers who were grouped together in the reports. Both politically and publicly, the Cabinet has already exhausted the benefit of its existence, even if its head continues to put off recommendations to break up the government and call early elections for days and weeks.

Hatzofe says that, beyond the practical recommendations included in the reports drawn up by the two committees on the Pollard affair, general conclusions are also required: Politicians should not be entrusted with the job of investigating deeds or misdeeds of politicians. This can only be done by a legal or professional body that is totally independent. The practice of setting one's own rules should be eradicated. The Cabinet should deal with issues that are within its jurisdiction and for which it is responsible. This requires that the size of the Cabinet be realistic, not inflated, and that it respect the rule of secrecy. The reports have created a state of interdependence among the top Cabinet members, so one must not expect them to push for the disbandment of the government and early elections in the foreseeable future. If this is indeed the case, the ministers will have to make sure that the Cabinet functions properly, that the ministers demonstrate a measure of respect for each other, and that the contempt for it we have witnessed over the past few months stop.

The Jerusalem Post writes that checks and balances lie at the heart of any well-ordered democratic policy. The democratic executive is supposed to be subject to control by parliament and to be kept in line by the judiciary. In this country, such oversight of the executive is largely a farce and will continue to be so until the political system is radically changed.

So long as the major party leaders have a mutual stake in sticking together, there is nothing the Knesset can do to shake or change them no matter how great the provocation nor how great the mismanagement of government.

Yated Ne'eman says that nothing has or will happen following the publication of the two reports. They carefully avoid harming anyone, even though direct responsibility is placed on Peres, Shamir, Arens, and Rabin. When everyone is to blame, this actually means that no one is guilty. No wonder political observers have described these reports as shallow; they in fact cover up events rather than properly expose them.

Midday Press

TA281002 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew
0800 GMT 28 May 87

[From the review of midday press editorials]

[Text] *Ma'ariv* describes the process by which the Rotenstreich committee's report was approved by the Cabinet as a farce, saying that in the future similar affairs should only be investigated by legal commissions of inquiry.

Hadashot holds a similar view, saying that the political echelon realizes now that in the future it will be difficult, or virtually impossible, to sell pseudo-legal gambits such as the Rotenstreich or Eban committee to the public.

Settlers Disappointed by Lack of Shamir Promises

TA280635 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English
28 May 87 p 2

[Report by Jeff Black]

[Text] Elon More — Prime Minister Shamir disappointed West Bank settlers yesterday by failing to make specific promises on new settlements during a visit here at the end of the seven-day mourning period for murder victim Rami Haba.

After attending a memorial gathering for the eight-year-old boy, held on the settlement's basketball court, the premier met with leaders of the Council of Jewish Settlements in Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza District.

The settlers told him the answer to terrorism was to establish new settlements and increase the size of existing ones. But Shamir, apparently, was not particularly forthcoming.

Daniyela Weiss, Gush Emunim's secretary-general, said afterwards: "The prime minister referred to his basic willingness to increase settlement but he wasn't specific. In comparison with what we expect from him, we are disappointed."

Despite the recent murders in the territories, Shamir said he did not think a new policy for the area was needed. He told reporters: "I think they (the army) will be able, in the very near future, to put an end to this wave of killings."

The premier also refused to say whether he supported the death penalty for terrorists. Shamir said the country was divided on the issue. He pointed out that the basic question involved was whether the death penalty acted as a deterrent. He added that "we need to discuss" this.

At the memorial ceremony, Shamir told the settlers, "All of Israel is united with you in memory of Rami." He promised that thousands of children would come and fill the area "with life and give strength to the people of Israel."

He described settlement in the West Bank as "holy work" and insisted that Israel's security depended on Jewish control of Judaea and Samaria as well as other areas of Israel.

Police To Investigate Shin Bet in Nafsu Affair

TA281625 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew
1605 GMT 28 May 87

[Text] Attorney General Yosef Harish is passing on to the police for investigation the suspicions against the Shin Bet personnel, that they gave false testimony in Lieutenant 'Izzat Nafsu's military trial. Tomorrow the material will be transferred to the police inspector general. Here is our correspondent on legal affairs, Gil'ad Sher:

Well, there is a final decision by the attorney general. The police are to investigate the suspicions that Shin Bet personnel gave false testimony to the military court that tried Nafsu. Tomorrow the attorney general will meet with Police Inspector General

David Kraus, and give him the relevant material, aliases, and so on. It has been learned that, as far as can be determined, the police will not be asked to investigate all the 11 members of the Shin Bet investigations team who were involved in collecting the information from 'Izzat Nafsu in 1980, but only 6 or 7 of them.

Attorney General Harish decided on the police investigation against the Shin Bet personnel who behaved incorrectly, in contrast to the views of Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir. The two of them met at noon and at that meeting Mr Shamir recommended that a commission of inquiry be established in accordance with the law of inquiry commissions. At the meeting the attorney general emphasized that his view was toward immediately passing the material over to the police.

As we reported this morning, there is firm opposition in the Shin Bet to any police investigation of the Shin Bet members. In a conversation held the day before yesterday investigators spoke out very sharply against the intention of passing over the inquiry to the Israeli Police. Let us, in conclusion, recall the specific instruction by the Supreme Court in its sentence on Nafsu's appeal, that definite moves should be taken to uproot the phenomenon of false testimony given by Shin Bet personnel.

Air Force Intercepts, Releases Lebanese Plane

TA281345 Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew
1330 GMT 28 May 87

[Text] A Fouga plane of the Lebanese Army was intercepted at noon by Israeli Air Force planes. The plane and its two pilots were released after a short interrogation. This was announced by an IDF spokesman.

At noon a Fouga military plane, with two pilots on board and on its way from north to south along the Lebanese coast, was detected. Air Force planes were launched toward the Lebanese plane and instructed it to land at one of the Air Force bases in the north. After a short check as to why the pilots approached the Israeli border and after they lunched at the base and had their plane refueled, both pilots and plane were released.

Shamir Sends 'Id al-Fitr Greetings to Mubarak

TA282140 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew
1600 GMT 28 May 87

[Text] Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir sent a congratulatory telegram to Egyptian President Husni Mubarak on the occasionof 'Id al-Fitr, which marks the end of the Ramadan fast. In his telegram Mr Shamir writes that during this feast of unity and peace we all express the wish that we succeed in making progress in the peace process and restore stability to the peoples of the region. On behalf of the Israeli Government and people, Mr Shamir extended good wishes to the Egyptian president, his family, and people. The telegram ends with the traditional Arabic wish of kul 'amm wa-antum bikhayr, a wish which is parallel to happy new year greetings.

$70 Million Needed for 'Arrow' Development

TA281031 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 28 May 87 p 2

[Report by Re'uven Pedatzur]

[Text] Israeli Aircraft Industries [IAI] needs approximately another $70 million to complete the development of the "Arrow" antimissile missile.

This missile is part of the U.S. "Star Wars" program and is meant to be an answer to the Soviet short-range surface-to-surface missiles.

IAI demonstrated the missile's performance before "Star Wars" officials by means of simulation. According to reports in the United States, the presentation of the missile aroused great interest, and senior U.S. sources said they were favorably impressed by its potential.

Senior IAI circles say that if the required amount of aid is given, IAI will undoubtedly be able to complete development ahead of all the other competitors who are trying to develop an antimissile missile.

Some U.S. congressional elements are averse to granting such a large sum to Israel. However, discussions between the two sides continue, and a convention to discusses various aspects of "Star Wars" opened in the United States yesterday with the participation of professionals and defense officials of both countries.

Israel hopes the U.S. defense establishment will arrive at the conclusion that the IAI solution for a defense system against short- range missiles is the best and will decide to allocate the sum needed to complete the development phase.

Although the development of the "Arrow" is designed for the U.S. defense program, the new missile could also be used by Israel in view of the fact that Syria has Soviet-made short-range SS-21 missiles and will apparently also receive SS-23 missiles from the Soviet Union in the future.

LIBYA

Al-Qadhdhafi Addresses University Students

LD281226 Tripoli Television Service in Arabic
2141 GMT 27 May 87

[Remarks by Libyan Leader Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi at a meeting with Al-Nasir University students; date not given — recorded]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] Colonialist political propaganda concentrates on driving a wedge between the Arabs and the black Africans. During the colonial era, European propaganda succeeded, and it is still successful. This is because most of the independent African states — especially those that achieved independence after 1960 — enjoy pseudo-independence; particularly the francophone states. These are still French colonies. The states that achieved some degree of actual political independence are the former Portuguese colonies. This is because Marxist movements were established in these states and are still in power there. Also, Portugal is a small state that grew weaker; it no longer had the ability to influence its former colonies. The latter no longer had a master; therefore, they became independent and began to rule themselves. As for France, it is a major power, capable of attracting its former colonies and capable of providing officials with salaries. It can train and provide weapons for the armies of its former colonies; it can support these former colonies' budgets. The former French colonies have therefore remained under French influence until now.

The anti-Arab Western colonialist propaganda concentrated on driving a wedge between the Arabs and the Africans. It succeeded. This means that many Africans show hatred toward Arabs, more so than toward Europe, which colonized, humiliated, and destroyed them. The Europeans do not resort to propaganda against themselves; they make themselves popular with the Africans. Consequently, the African loves the European but hates the Arab. The Europeans colonized the Africans, but there is no anti-European feeling among the Africans. Yet the Europeans spread anti-Arab propaganda among the Africans. We did not colonize these states; they did not hear our voice, and we did not defend ourselves. They [the Europeans] told them [the Africans]: Those who occupied North Africa — the area extending to Damascus and the Middle East — are Arabs. They are dangerous; they are colonialists, and it is possible they will march against you.

This type of propaganda is now successful in Chad. That is to say, the Chadian politicians may hate the Libyans but do not hate the Americans and the French. They seek assistance from the French forces and fight against the Libyan forces. Why? Because Western propaganda succeeded in making the Africans hate the Arabs. It told them that the Arabs are colonialists. Now Chadians regard Arabs as colonialists — they regard Libyans as colonialists — while they do not look upon the French or the Americans as such.

Actually, the real colonialist is the European, the Westerner, the French, and the American. These are the people who are really colonizing Chad, Africa, and Libya. [as heard] But because the European and the Westerner are the masters and are successful in their propaganda, they rule. The Arab homeland should therefore be isolated from the south, as the anti-Arab movements come from the south. There is now an anti-Arab movement in southern Sudan. [passage omitted]

Now there is an intensified hostility toward Libya created by the Western states. They talk about Libyan missiles which can reach southern Europe. This is an exaggeration. A Libyan missile might cover a distance of 100 km, but they say that it can travel 1,000 km. They try to magnify the ugly picture they want to implant in the minds of the West, so that the West will prepare to invade and persecute the Arab homeland. They say: Look, there is a new power emerging on the southern shores of the Mediterranean, and this will mean a new series of conquests. They want to remind the West of the Arab conquests of southern Italy, Spain, and the islands of the Mediterranean. They say that the Arabs will rape women and destroy towns and churches. Their books are full of such stories. We could not have done such things. Our books have nothing like that. These books speak about our victories in this or that battle. But their books are terrible. [passage omitted]

Now the blacks are being incited by the colonialist Western states, the colonialist circles. They are pushing the blacks to act against the Arabs. There are movements south of the Arab homeland — south of Sudan, Libya, Mauritania, and Algeria — and Europe and the United States are behind all of them. The West is behind these movements. The West wants to bring pressure to bear on the Arab homeland. Why is there such enmity? Why does this homeland always face such pressure? The West has no ambitions with regard to the people, the Arabs, men or women. The West wants the land, the bridge. The Arab homeland by its shape constitutes a land bridge. All the powers that have imperialist interests — interests outside their own borders — want to control this bridge.

The Suez Canal, the Bab el-Mandeb. [Al-Qadhdhafi here addresses one of the people who is close to the map] Please point to these on the map, Salih. Please come here, one of you. This is the Suez Canal; it is a gate from the north to the south. Then there is the Bab el-Mandeb, which is the second gate. Then the Strait of Hormuz — it is also a gate — and the Strait of Gibraltar. Look at these international gates. Europe is to the north, and Africa is to the south. The Arab homeland is a bridge, from west to east and from east to west. The aim is to seize this bridge. On the one hand, they want to seize these gates and these international strategic points. If there is resistance in these parts, they cannot seize them. How can resistance succeed? It succeeds through the activities of the population and the military.

This is why they concentrated on keeping this region backward, so that the defensive capability of this area is weakened. Thus the major conspiracy is to deceive us, particularly with regard to oil. The reactionary, ignorant, and backward political regimes — against which there have been revolutions that have not yet succeeded — and those who have established these regimes are deceiving us by transforming us into a consumer market. They kept us away from genuine production, and cultures based on consumption spread. Shops in the Arab homeland spread. There are 100,000 merchants in Damascus. There should be 100,000

farmers, blacksmiths, carpenters, and electricians in Damascus, not 100,000 merchants. [passage omitted]

Generally speaking, there is a real danger to the region between the ocean and Gulf. The oases will run dry as a result of the use of pumps. The overpopulated towns that have no resources will face problems and become dilapidated. There is continuous enmity toward the homeland by an advance from the south. Hostile European propaganda has succeeded in creating armed movements against the Arab homeland and its southern parts: southern Libya, southern Sudan, southern Mauritania, etc.

The West is getting ready, and what we have seen are only the preliminaries — the NATO attack against Libya, Israeli military capability, the destruction of the Arab homeland from within, the destruction of Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and Tunisia — all these are preliminaries. What some call Israel is a bridgehead. Israel sends a force to the area it wants to occupy in order to establish a foothold, a bridgehead, so that the bigger force can cross over. Western colonialism will inevitably come. These are preliminaries leading to the military phase. First propaganda is used, lackeys are sent, and coups are hatched or crushed.

But now the military phase to occupy the Arab homeland has begun. Do not rule out the possibility that utterances will change and that they will begin to talk about the necessity of occupying this or that place. Now the United States is talking about the Gulf. The Gulf does not belong to it. The United States says that the Gulf affects its security, and it declares a state of emergency during the Reagan era because Libya threatens U.S. interests at home and abroad. This state of emergency means that the U.S. President has the power, without consulting with Congress, to make any decision, such as to attack Libya. The state of emergency finds its own justifications. Tomorrow they may say: We fear for international communications from attacks by terrorists; therefore, the peace-loving and rational power that is responsible for security is seizing such communications. We will then see the United States occupying Gibraltar, the Suez Canal, Bab el-Mandeb, etc.

Imagine the Gulf of Sidra — they left all other parts of the sea and came to the stretch which lies between Misratah and Banghazi! The United States says at international forums that international navigation in the Mediterranean is being threatened by Al-Qadhdhafi and that it is inevitable that the United States should impose its presence in the interest of international navigation. We told them: Suppose a ship travels through the Gulf of Sidra heading for Ghadamis or Jufrah, how can you consider this international navigation? Have we barred the way to all those crossing the Mediterranean or said that one can no longer travel in the Mediterranean from east to west or from north to south?

Look at their excuse! They fought us. There was a battle that took place between them and us at the line of death. We downed four of their aircraft. They hit two of our ships. Scores of Libyan sailors died at the line of death. Americans were killed; their aircraft were downed. They came here and said that it was in defense of their freedom. [passage omitted]

In addition to the occupation of this bridgehead, the capture of the Mediterranean is vital as far as the imperialists are concerned because the Arab coastline is very important from the military, commercial, and tourist points of view. I mean the entire Arab coastline, from Mauritania to Syria. It faces Europe. If there is a force on this coastline, it may threaten southern Europe. I told you that when their propaganda claims that Libya possesses missiles which can reach southern Europe, it is a warning that the southern coastline of the Mediterranean will be occupied. [passage omitted]

Reagan issued so much propaganda that, had he wanted to drop an atomic bomb on Libya, he could have gotten most Americans to agree with him. He lied. He asked the American people: Have you heard about the squad which has come to kill me? The people said: Yes, we have heard. There was no proof. He told them a pack of lies. He said: We should put an end to the Libyan regime; we are only defending our homes. He told them that there is a line of death in the Mediterranean and it is dangerous. Do you see the injustice?

They say that the Palestinians are terrorists. Why? Because the Palestinians reject their bridgehead, Israel. They justify any action taken against the Palestinians. They say that the PLO is a terrorist organization. Putting an end to the PLO satisfies Israel. When one fights and establishes a bridgehead one has to defend such a bridgehead, and now they are defending their bridgehead, Israel. They defend against those undermining the bridgehead. They say: Allow us to strike against the Palestinians, the Syrians, the Libyans, and the Lebanese. Why? Because all these support the Palestinians.

Every potential revolution in the Arab homeland is being aborted. This is because [words indistinct] there is no socialism, no production, and no military power. They say that the vacuum should be filled by the imperialist powers. This state of affairs continues; this is the reason behind our loss in all the revolutions that took place in the Arab homeland. They are now concentrating on the Libyan revolution because it is a positive phenomenon and has a sound orientation; for this reason they say that it should be liquidated. They created the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Liberation Party, the mujahidin, etc.; U.S. intelligence was behind all of these. They also formed movements in Chad. They will create any false organization in order to mislead the people. [words indistinct]

Now the United States has access to bases for its deployment force in a number of Arab countries; this was agreed on in advance. But it cannot do this in Libya or in Syria. Take Egypt, for example: The United States at any time can bring all its forces to Egypt and from there deploy them anywhere. It cannot do so in Libya; hence, it struggles against Libya. They struggled against 'Abd al-Nasir and now against Libya. They cannot do the same in Algeria. We have talked about the things we should guard against and about certain problems. In the next lecture, God willing, we will talk about the solutions. Wait for the next lecture.

USSR's Katushev Signs Cooperation Agreement

LD281400 Tripoli Domestic Service in Arabic 1230 GMT 28 May 87

[Text] The signing of the minutes of an agreement for technical, economic, and scientific cooperation between the Great Jamahiriyah and the USSR took place at noon today in Tripoli. The minutes were signed on the Libyan side by the brother secretary of the General People's Committee for Public Service and on the Soviet side by Katushev, head of the Soviet State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations.

Katushev, Delegation Depart

LD290911 Tripoli JANA in Arabic 0710 GMT 29 May 87

[Text] Tripoli, 29 May (JANA) — Konstantin Katushev, head of the Soviet State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, and members of his delegation left Tripoli yesterday evening at the end of their visit to the Great Jamahiriyah.

In a statement to JANA, Katushev praised the results of his visit to the Great Jamahiriyah, which falls within the framework of the development and bolstering of relations between the Great Jamahiriyah and the USSR.

He said the two sides reached agreement in all fields, and added that the agreements must be implemented during the next 5 years for the good of the two friendly peoples.

MOROCCO

King Hassan Pardons Prisoners on Holiday

LD290614 Rabat Domestic Service in Arabic 2300 GMT 28 May 87

[Text] The Ministry of Justice has issued the following statement: On the occasion of the happy 'Id al-Fitr, his majesty issued orders to reduce life imprisonment sentences to limited imprisonment for 6 prisoners; eliminated the remainder of the imprisonment or detention period for 324 prisoners; reduced the imprisonment or detention period for 97 prisoners; eliminated only the detention period punishment for 98 persons; and dismissed fines to be paid for 6 persons.

May God preserve our master as a haven for this nation and as a source of mercy and compassion. May God make this 'Id return many times with victory for his majesty and bless Crown Prince Sidi Mohamed and his brother, Moulay Rachid, and the entire royal family.

SUDAN

Correction to Report on 20 May SPLA Ambush

The following correction pertains to the item under the subheading "'Remarkable Ambush' Kills 122," published in the 28 May Middle East & Africa *Daily Report*, page Q 3:

Paragraph one, from line five reads: ...Lieutenant Obutu Mamur Mete took place on the Torit-Kapoeta road between Lobira... (correcting surname and place name)

Paragraph two, from line two reads: ...Colonel Glario Modi Paringyang, destroyed 16 enemy trucks and... (correcting surname and changing number)

Same paragraph, from line three reads: ...which was a howitzer tank. More than... (providing indistinct word)

Paragraph three, from line three reads: ...Col Glario Modi Paringyang, overall commander of... (correcting surname)

Same paragraph, from line five reads: ...Lt Obutu Mamur Mete, officers, NCO's, and men of... (correcting surname and changing "and commanding officers" to "NCO's")

TUNISIA

Bourguiba Pardons Opposition Group Members

LD281720 Tunis TAP in French 1645 GMT 28 May 87

[Excerpt] Tunis, 28 May (TAP) — President Bourguiba has pardoned those sentenced in the left-wing Tunisian Socialist Federation [RST] affair and has issued a decree to this effect. This was announced this morning by Tunisian Justice Minister Mohamed Salah 'Ayyar following a meeting with the head of state. You will recall that 13 members of this opposition organization were sentenced to 6 months in prison on 12 May this year for belonging to an illegal association.

The minister also announced that on the occasion of 1 June, Victory Day, President Bourguiba has issued a decree granting a pardon to another 198 people. [passage omitted]

WESTERN SAHARA

Morocco Suffers 'Substantial' Losses 12-25 May

LD282229 Algiers Domestic Service in French 2200 GMT 28 May 87

[Text] In Western Sahara, the Saharan Popular Liberation Army carried out 37 attacks and bombings along and inside the Moroccan defense walls during the period between 12 and 25 May. A communique states that there were substantial human and material losses on the Moroccan side.

ETHIOPIA

Justice Minister Returns From Hungary, Romania

EA281022 Addis Ababa Domestic Service in Amharic 1700 GMT 27 May 87

[Text] Comrade Wondayen Mehretu noted today that the ninth meeting of the socialist justice ministers held in Budapest, Hungary, ended with an expression of firm support for the preservation of world peace and human rights. The alternate member of the WPE Central Committee and minister of law and justice said this in an arrival statement at Addis Ababa's Bole International Airport. The minister and his three-member delegation were returning from the meeting and from working visits to Hungary and Romania.

Comrade Wondayen said the session, which was attended by the justice ministers of 16 states, focused on legislation and the administration of justice as experienced in the progress of the respective countries regarding the preparation of [words indistinct]. He said that after extensive discussion, the participants approved a resolution on preserving world peace and human rights and ending terrorism.

KENYA

Border Tension With Uganda Continues

Moi on 'Provocation'

EA281922 Nairobi Domestic Service in English 1600 GMT 28 May 87

[Text] His Excellency President Daniel arap Moi said today that Uganda's false accusations that Kenya had deployed its troops along the border were a pack of lies whose aim was provocation. The president further said that the NRA [National Resistance Army] were shooting Ugandans and blaming the murders on Kenya. Kenya, pointed out the president, had never tortured any Ugandans, but was instead offering medical treatment to Ugandans at Busia Hospital.

President Moi was speaking at Busia border post this afternoon where he flew to see the situation. President Moi walked across the no-man's-land up to the entrance to Uganda. The only sight of closure was on the Ugandan side, where several lorries and tankers were awaiting clearance by the Ugandan authorities to cross into Kenya. After Ugandans complained that they had no sugar and bread on their side, President Moi instructed the western provincial commissioner to give those Ugandans at the border 10 bags of sugar free of charge.

President Moi said that Uganda ought to concentrate on solving its people's basic food requirements, instead of engaging in an unwarranted propaganda against Kenya. He further noted that it was naive for Uganda to lie that Kenya had placed heavy artillery at Port Sio and Lwakhakha. The president wondered why Kenya should place guns at those points since they were not even important crossing points.

President Moi noted that Kenyans arrested in Uganda, falsely accused of spying, had just strayed into that country. He reiterated that as far as Kenya was concerned, the border was wide open, adding that panya [smuggling] routes used by smugglers had been sealed with the mutual agreement between the two countries.

Ugandans, noted the president, wanted to come to Kenya without proper documentations, which is contrary to regulations governing international borders. President Moi said that the hullabaloo was caused by the Ugandan Government when its people could not meet these internationally accepted requirements.

On arrival at the border post, President Moi was cheered by both Kenyans and Ugandans. When President Moi asked the Ugandans whether they had seen any Kenyan troops along the border, they replied with an emphatic no.

President Moi was accompanied by, among others, Ministers Elijah Mwangale, Peter Okondo, Nicholas Biwott, the permanent secretary in the office of the president in charge of provincial administration and internal security, Mr Hezekiah Oyugi, the western provincial commissioner, Mr Julius Kobia, and the commissioner of customs, Mr Cheruiyot.

Meanwhile President Moi will tomorrow conduct a fund-raising meeting at Kerugoya Stadium in aid of all secondary schools in Kirinyaga District from 11 o'clock in the morning.

Security Talks 'Aborted'

EA290938 Nairobi DAILY NATION in English 29 May 87 p 1

["Kenya and Uganda Security Talks Fail" by Catherine Gicheru]

[Excerpts] Talks on Kenya-Uganda security aborted yesterday because the Ugandan minister for internal affairs, Mr Paul Ssemogerere, failed to arrive. Mr Ssemogerere and a permanent secretary, Mr Katamba Jujjo, were expected to hold talks yesterday with a minister of state, Mr Justus Ole Tipis.

Mr Ssemogerere and his team were scheduled to arrive on a Uganda airline plane from Entebbe at 12.50 p.m. The plane came but he was not on board. The head of the Africa desk in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr Omar Fakih, told the *Nation* they had no information as to why Mr Ssemogerere did not arrive. Mr Fakih said the minister was still waiting for information about Mr Ssemogerere.

The Uganda deputy high commissioner, Mr J. Bigombe, said at the Jomo Kenyatta international airport that they had been expecting Mr Ssemogerere and his entourage. He could not venture any reason why the Ugandan minister did not arrive. He would contact Kampala for information.

Last evening, Mr Bigombe said, he had been unable to contact Kampala due to the Idd Mubarak celebrations. He suggested that the minister may have been held back for the same reason.

But aboard the flight which arrived yesterday from Entebbe was Uganda's minister for housing and urban planning, Mr J. Uuakhapabulo, who is in Kenya on official business unrelated to Mr Ssemogerere's.

The planned talks came in the wake of deteriorating relations between the two countries. [passage omitted]

Latest reports from Uganda quoted Mr Ssemogerere as saying he would visit Nairobi to discuss security with Kenya. We're making arrangements for my visit to Nairobi, but no date has yet been confirmed, he told the *Associated Press*.

TANZANIA

Mwinyi Receives Mozambican Prime Minister

EA281303 Dar es Salaam Domestic Service in Swahili 1000 GMT 28 May 87

[Excerpt] In Dar es Salaam, President Ali Hassan Mwinyi has said that Tanzania will continue to cooperate with Mozambique on questions of common interest. President Mwinyi made this comment at a meeting with Mozambican Prime Minister Dr Mario Machungo, who called on him at State House in Dar es Salaam this morning.

The talks between the two leaders centered on matters of mutual and international interest. Dr Machungo also briefed President Mwinyi on the war in Mozambique against the South African-backed MNR bandits, and the response by the international community to the call for assistance for Mozambique.

The talks were also attended by the prime minister and first vice president, Ndugu Joseph Warioba. [passage omitted]

UGANDA

Foreign Minister Mukiibi Visits France

For a Paris radio report on the visit to France by Foreign Minister Ibrahim Mukiibi, including his comments on relations with Kenya, see the France section of the 28 May Western Europe *Daily Report*.

CHAD

French Cooperation Minister Continues Meetings

Attends Committee Session

AB281201 Ndjamena Domestic Service in French 0530 GMT 28 May 87

[Excerpts] French Cooperation Minister Michel Aurillac begins the 2d day of his visit in Ndjamena today. Mr Aurillac held private talks yesterday with President Hissein Habre. The French cooperation minister leaves Ndjamena this morning for Faya-Largeau. [passage omitted]

Foreign Minister Gouara Lassou, who returned home yesterday from a visit, addressed the opening session of the Chad-France joint commission meeting, which began yesterday.

[Begin recording] [passage omitted] Mr Minister, the document creating our joint commission notes that we should meet once a year, alternately in one of the two countries. The present session, therefore, should have taken place in Paris, your beautiful capital. But we are again happy to welcome you to Ndjamena so that you and your delegation accompanying you can learn of the efforts made since 1984 by the people and Government of Chad to improve on the situation in which they found themselves. The results achieved were made possible thanks to assistance from friendly countries, among which France occupies a prominent place, as well as from nongovernmental, international organizations. [passage omitted]

Mr Minister, Chad continues to be the target of daily aggression by Libya, with whom any form of dialogue is virtually impossible. The most tangible proof of this is Libya's absence from the meeting of the OAU ad hoc committee on the Chad-Libya border dispute and from its subcommittee of experts held in Libreville in April and May 1987.

Having no argument to present, Libya prefers to resort to arms. In fact, having been defeated in Fada, Ouadi Doum, and Faya-Largeau, the enemy has withdrawn to the extreme north of Chad where it has concentrated men and materiel in order to launch a new war against Chad.

Mr Minister, we would like to express here our profound gratitude to all friendly countries, and especially to France, for the aid they gave Chad at the most difficult moments. This assistance permitted our country to pass a decisive turning point in its liberation struggle. Our wish is that these friendly countries will continue to give their assistance for the total recovery of our territory.

However, the people of Chad are a peaceful people, who still believe in the virtue of dialogue to settle interstate disputes on the basis of mutual respect. We want to reaffirm that freedom is priceless. Chad has made enormous sacrifices and will continue to do so to remain free, if need be. To this end, it will not tolerate interference in its domestic affairs from any foreign power whatsoever. Chad could not have found a better partner than France, a country of freedom and (?brotherhood), which jealously guards its independence, freedom, and dignity.

Mr Minister, I dare to hope that in the course of our discussions on the issues at stake, an atmosphere of mutual understanding will prevail. Wishing full success to our deliberations, I declare the fourth session of the Chad-France joint commission open. [applause] [end recording] [passage omitted]

Visits Faya-Largeau

AB282122 Ndjamena Domestic Service in French 1845 GMT 28 May 87

[Excerpts] As scheduled, visiting French Cooperation Minister Michel Aurillac went to Faya-Largeau this morning. He was accompanied by Chadian Foreign Minister Gouara Lassou and many French and Chadian officials, including the French ambassador to Chad, His Excellency Christian Dutheil de la Rochere. [passage omitted]

After being welcomed by the prefect of the BET [Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti region], the Chadian and French delegation toured the entire town, including the prefecture's headquarters, the civil and military hospitals, the oasis and [words indistinct] of Faya. According to our special reporter, Celestin Fofana, life in Faya is returning to normal but the marks of the Libyan occupation are still vivid. After the visit, the BET prefect, [name indistinct], delivered his welcoming address in which he expressed his prefecture's needs. [passage omitted]

Minister Michel Aurillac, who visited our country 28 years ago when Chad was not yet independent, assured people in the BET in general and in Faya-Largeau in particular, that to assist the devastated region, the French Government will implement an emergency rehabilitation program in accordance with the desires of the Chadian Government. The visit enabled Minister Aurillac to see the region's considerable agricultural potential for himself. [passage omitted]

Mr Aurillac further announced that France will fully honor its commitments to support the Chadian Government's reconciliation efforts and to contribute substantially to Chad's social and economic reconstruction.

Minister Aurillac will go to Mongo tomorrow to assess that region's needs. He will return to Ndjamena during the day to preside over, along with the Chadian foreign minister, the closing ceremony of the fourth session of the Chad-France joint commission. Those deliberations, which began yesterday, ended today at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation.

MOZAMBIQUE

PRC Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian Continues Visit

Promises Continued Aid

MB281246 Maputo in English to Southern Africa 1100 GMT 28 May 87

[Text] The foreign minister of China, Wu Xueqian, says his country will continue to help Mozambique resolve its present difficulties. Mr Wu was speaking in Maputo this morning at the opening of official talks with a Mozambican Government delegation led by the foreign minister, Pascoal Mocumbi.

The Chinese minister said his first visit to Mozambique is aimed at reinforcing bilateral relations that date back to the national liberation struggle against Portuguese colonialism. Mr Wu says China is paying a lot of attention to the present difficulties facing Mozambique and will continue to make contribution, though limited, to help the Mozambican people.

The Mozambican foreign minister, Dr Mocumbi, says Mr Wu's visit is a manifestation of the long-standing friendship and solidarity between China and Mozambique. Dr Mocumbi says he sees the visit as a common wish to reinforce ties. During the talks, the two sides will also be discussing the situation in southern Africa and other parts of the world.

This afternoon, Mr Wu is expected to be received by President Joaquim Chissano and visit a factory in Maputo which enjoys Chinese financial and technical assistance. Mr Wu is scheduled to leave Mozambique tomorrow to continue his African tour.

Meets With President Chissano

MB281833 Maputo in English to Southern Africa 1800 GMT 28 May 87

[Text] President Joaquim Chissano this afternoon received in audience the visiting Chinese foreign minister, Wu Xueqian. During the meeting with the president, Mr Wu transmitted greetings from China's president, Li Xiannian.

Mr Wu visited the Ritmo footwear factory in Maputo this afternoon. During the visit the Chinese ambassador in Maputo spoke about the rehabilitation of the factory with China's financial support.

Signs Accord, Departs

MB290901 Maputo in English to Southern Africa 0800 GMT 29 May 87

[Text] PRC Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian left Maputo this morning for Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, as he continues his visits to a number of African countries. During his stay in the country, the Chinese foreign minister held talks with the Mozambican Government which climaxed with the signing of cooperation agreements. In the terms of the agreements signed yesterday, China will make available to Mozambique about 3.5 million meticals worth of assorted goods which include basic commodities. China will also assist our country in the drilling of boreholes for the supply of drinkable water to the outskirts of Maputo city.

Ugandan President Confers With Chissano

Close Relations Emphasized

MB280937 Maputo Domestic Service in Portuguese 0800 GMT 28 May 87

[Text] President Joaquim Chissano said in Maputo yesterday that the visit by Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni was timely in getting the joint cooperation commission moving. President Chissano expressed hope the comission would be approved during his counterpart's visit to Mozambique. President Chissano also emphasized the potential for the two countries' economies to complement each other and promote the much desired South-South cooperation.

In turn, Yoweri Museveni described the existing relations between the two countries as very close, having been tested over the years by action and sacrifice. He pointed out that the efforts by racist South Africa to destabilize southern African countries are doomed to failure in the long run. This morning, the Ugandan president paid homage to Mozambican heroes by laying a wreath at the Mozambican Heroes Monument. A few moments ago, President Museveni conveyed his condolences to the Machel family on President Samora Machel's 19 October 1986 death. Mozambique and Uganda are also expected to begin official talks this morning.

Official Talks Begin

MB281217 Maputo Domestic Service in Portuguese 1030 GMT 28 May 87

[Text] The opening session of talks between Mozambique and Uganda centered on bilateral discussions — security in Mozambique and Uganda, the desire for economic links, and the certainty of maximizing mutual support. Mozambican participants in the talks, which are led by Presidents Joaquim Chissano and Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, include the following: Armando Guebuza, Mozambican minister of transport and communication; Feliciano Gundana, minister in the Office of the President; John Kachamila, minister of mineral resources; Armando Panguene, deputy minister of defense; Daniel Mbanze, deputy minister of foreign affairs, and other government officials. The Ugandan leader is accompanied by Professor (Kagimbere), minister of state for foreign affairs; Sebaana Kizito, minister of cooperatives and marketing; and Professor Mulema, minister of regional cooperation, as well as other members of his delegation.

Speaking at the talks' opening session, President Joaquim Chissano thanked President Museveni for his visit to Mozambique to pay homage to the memory of President Samora Machel, adding that this demonstrated President Museveni is our brother, a member of our family.

This morning, the distinguished visitor laid a wreath at the Mozambican Heroes Monument and paid homage to the mem-

ory of Samora Machel at the tomb where he was buried. President Yoweri Museveni then offered condolences to Mrs Graca Machel and her family. The Ugandan president's visit, which is due to end tomorrow, will continue this afternoon with visits to places of economic interest.

'Brief' Discussions Held

MB290640 Maputo in English to Southern Africa 1800 GMT 28 May 87

[From the "Indaba" program]

[Text] The president of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, is currently on an official visit to Mozambique. President Museveni and the Mozambican leader, Joaquim Chissano, began talks in Maputo this morning, and the Ugandan leader made a brief statement at the start of the discussion:

[Begin Museveni recording] Dear comrade president, first of all, I must thank you for inviting me and enabling me to fulfill my wish to come and lay a wreath on the grave of Comrade Samora [Machel] and the graves of the other comrades, and also to pay my condolences to the family of Comrade Samora Machel.

We should also take advantage of this time to discuss other matters — bilateral matters which affect our two countries, matters which affect the security and which affect the economy especially, matters we agreed we shall discuss in various forums and come to some concrete arrangements, especially on matters in connection with economic fields, so that we can maximize areas of mutual support. [end recording]

Lusaka Radio Reports MNR Attack Near Border

MB280901 Lusaka Domestic Service in English 0600 GMT 28 May 87

[Text] Mozambique National Resistance bandits have raided Zumbo, a few kilometers across the Zambian border at Luangwa. Sources at Luangwa said the (?start) of the raid, which lasted a few hours yesterday, had been marked by heavy machinegun fire, shelling, and (?thick columns) of smoke over part of the district. The raid, the second since last October, has sent a fresh outflow of Mozambican refugees into Zambia.

SOUTH AFRICA

Military Reportedly Kills Several in Maputo Raid

MB291007 Umtata Capital Radio in English 1000 GMT 29 May 87

[Text] South African commandos are reported to have attacked several targets in Maputo. The Portuguese news agency, LUSA, says several people have been killed in the raid in the early hours of this morning. The agency quotes unidentified Mozambican Government officials as saying the commandos struck at several houses in central Maputo. It says the number of victims isn't known. No further details are immediately available.

SADF Refuses Comment

MB291030 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1028 GMT 29 May 87

[Text] Pretoria, May 29, SAPA — An SADF spokesman in Pretoria said today the Defence Force was "not prepared to comment on unsubstantiated allegations of involvement in incidents in Mozambique."

She was reacting to reports of a "South African commando" raid in a residential district of Maputo early today.

Three Mozambicans were reportedly killed.

"There have been similar attempts in the past to link the Defence Force with incidents elsewhere, for example in Harare recently," the spokesman continued.

"In this case foreign television personnel and others were later apprehended. Two were later released after a week in detention and this is further proof of actions and allegations without substantiation," the spokesman said.

According to reports from Maputo, the Mozambicans were killed in an attack on four houses in Maputo's exclusive Polana suburb early today.

Two of those reportedly shot dead with silenced weapons were Antonio Pateguana — the brother-in-law of the chief-of-staff of Mozambique's Armed Forces — and his wife.

ANC Statement Claims Johannesburg Court Bombings

MB281408 Johannesburg Domestic Service in Afrikaans 1400 GMT 28 May 87

[Text] The ANC has claimed responsibility for the two car bomb explosions outside the Johannesburg Magistrates Court last week. In a statement issued in Lusaka, the organization says that its military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe, or Spear of the Nation, planted the bombs in the motor vehicles. Four policemen were killed and another 14 people injured by the explosion, which also damaged over 40 vehicles.

ANC: 27 Soldiers, Police Killed in Recent Weeks

MB281916 Lusaka Domestic Service in English 1800 GMT 28 May 87

[Text] The ANC of South Africa says its military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe, has in the past few weeks intensified its offensive against the apartheid regime of South Africa, inflicting heavy losses on both the Army and police.

According to a statement released by ANC chief representative in Tanzania, at least 27 South African Army and police personnel have been killed in the last few weeks.

ANC's Tambo Announces Easing of Cultural Boycott

MB290634 Umtata Capital Radio in English
0600 GMT 29 May 87

[Text] In a dramatic move, the ANC has partly eased its rigid cultural boycott on South Africa. The ban on plays by anti-apartheid groups has ended, although there will be no general relaxation on entertainments isolation. It is not known if this will allow the sale of TV material, particularly BBC drama, which is totally banned.

The change of heart was announced by ANC leader-in-exile Oliver Tambo and is the first ever sign of flexibility on the blanket cultural boycott which has seen South African performers and productions barred from appearing abroad.

4 KwaNdebele Activists Reportedly Detained

MB281219 Umtata Capital Radio in English
1200 GMT 28 May 87

[Text] Diplomats in Johannesburg say four KwaNdebele anti-independence activists have been detained. They were picked up after addressing diplomats on the situation in their homeland yesterday.

The diplomats say Prince Cornelius and Prince Andries Mahlangu were detained along with two unnamed people. However, the *City Press* newspaper says Prince Andries managed to get away. Police have been unable to confirm the detentions, as it is a public holiday today.

Police Issue Unrest Report Covering 28 May

MB290715 Johannesburg SAPA in English
0719 GMT 29 May 87

[Text] Pretoria, May 29, SAPA — Here is the unrest report for yesterday issued by the public relations division of the SA Police:

The following incidents of unrest were reported overnight:

At Umlazi, near Durban, a privately owned vehicle was damaged in a petrolbomb attack.

A black man was slightly injured when a bus was stoned on the Thambuza Road, near Pietermaritzburg. Damage to the bus was very slight.

At Taylors Halt, also near Pietermaritzburg, a black man sustained slight injuries when a private home was stoned.

At Bongulethu, near Oudtshoorn, a private home was damaged by arsonists.

At Nyanga, near Cape Town, an unknown person fired at a security force patrol. Two members sustained slight injuries. Members returned fire and the attackers fled.

At Daveyton, near Benoni, a private vehicle was set alight. Damage was extensive.

ZAMBIA

Prime Minister Discusses Economic Program

MB251723 London BBC World Service in English
1515 GMT 25 May 87

[From the "Focus on Africa" program]

[Text] Zambians must still be puzzling over which direction President Kaunda intends to take the economy. At the beginning of this month, he announced that Zambia was breaking with its IMF program under which a two-tier exchange rate was introduced, leading to prices fluctuating from one week to the next. An attempt last December to remove subsidies on the staple food, mealie [corn] meal, had led to violent revolts on the Copperbelt. Two weeks ago, in a sweeping change of direction, President Kaunda reshuffled his cabinet, saying that although the IMF program was being abandoned, the government was still sticking to its economic recovery measures. Meanwhile, the IMF has offered to resume talks. Zambia's prime minister, Kebby Musokotwane, passed through London this weekend and Robin White asked him just what the position was.

[Begin recording] [Musokotwane] We are trying to work out our own program. As you know, we have been having IMF programs since 1975. We have had about four of these, and then, in the last few months, we have been carrying out very serious and intensive negotiations with the IMF to see whether we would reach another standby program with them. Unfortunately, there were a number of areas in which we couldn't agree with the IMF, and so Zambia has decided that it is going to work out its own economic program and we are hoping that in the final analysis, the developed countries, the World Bank, and if possible the IMF, can identify themselves with that program.

[White] What are the things in the IMF package which you just in the end could not accept? What was the gap?

[Musokotwane] The first main one was on the question of the exchange rate regime. As you know, we introduced the auction system, and it has been tried in the last 3 years now. But in the last 3 years, we have seen our national currency being devalued by over 700 percent. We have seen inflation rising from 20 to 60 percent. We have seen unemployment rising. We have seen prices of commodities, including the staple food, increasing tremendously.

[White] What would you say to the accusation that, in fact, you have been a rather weak government? You haven't been able to push through what you know you should push through. As soon as there has been any kind of revolt in the Copperbelt towns or whatever, you just surrendered.

[Musokotwane] I still have to come across any one country, whether developed or developing, that is as courageous as Zambia — in the whole world — where your currency in 2 years can be devalued by over 700 percent, where prices increase sevenfold in 2 years, and still be able to be a united country. So, I think that we have been able to take on a lot of courage, and the Zambian people have stood very firmly behind the leadership of

our president and so... [changes thought] no, I think that we have acted from strength.

[White] They haven't stood behind the government. They have revolted.

[Musokotwane] No, I don't think that they did. I don't think that one can say that the skirmishes that there were on the Copperbelt is a revolt. They are showing anger; they are showing indignation against certain policies, but it is not a revolt.

[White] By the way, even if you come up with your own program, aren't Zambians going to have to accept some pretty unpalatable things in the next few years?

[Musokotwane] It is better that they accept unpalatable things as a result of our decisions instead of having unpalatable things as a result of the advice of somebody else, and especially if that advice, over years, doesn't seem to have succeeded.

[White] What kind of things are they going to have to accept?

[Musokotwane] Naturally, they will accept that not all items on the market now can continue to be available. In other words, we are going to be selective how we use our scarce foreign exchange. We will not any more allow the importation of bottled beer like we were doing under the IMF program because of the liberalization of the imports into the country. We are going to target certain areas in our economy and simply give priority to those areas. We are going to cut away certain items that now people might have got used to, but which they can do without, if we are going to rebuild our economy. So, there are going to be difficulties before we can begin to be on top again.

[White] Will you keep the subsidies on mealie meal?

[Musokotwane] Yes, we will. But we will reduce the subsidy but over a longer period, instead of reducing the subsidy over maybe a year or 2 or 3 years. It simply is not possible. You see, the question of unity, the question of peace in any country, must be seen as an economic input. Without it, never mind how good policies — economic policies — you have, they won't work.

[White] You said that you want to give priority to certain things. Now which things are you going to give priority to?

[Musokotwane] We will make sure that our mining companies have adequate foreign exchange so that we can increase on the production of copper. We are going to give a lot of priority to agriculture, especially in areas like irrigation and so on. We are going to reorganize our small-scale mining. We are going to reorganize our export drive, because I think that we have a lot that we can sell.

[White] Do you think the IMF — already they have said: Come on, keep talking to us — do you see signs that the IMF might be changing its tune at all toward Zambia and toward Third World countries in general?

[Musokotwane] Well, first of all, we will continue to be members of the IMF. If, after our program has been worked out, they are able to identify themselves with that program, well and good. [end recording]

ZIMBABWE

Police Detain 4 in Bombing Investigations

MB281835 Johannesburg SAPA in English
1255 GMT 28 May 87

[Text] Harare, May 28, SAPA — Police in Harare have detained three pilots and a storekeeper all working for an air charter company in connection with recent bombings, a government spokesman confirmed today.

The spokesman told ZIANA, the domestic news agency that three pilots — Mr Xavier van den Burg, Mr Sean Carson and Mr Peter Knobel — and the store-keeper, Mr Andrew Muketiwa, were helping the police in their investigations into recent bombings.

All four are employees of United Air Charter.

Last week police detained three foreign journalists for the same reasons.

2 Detained Journalists Freed

MB281950 Johannesburg Domestic Service in English
1916 GMT 28 May 87

[Excerpt] Police in Harare have released two of the three journalists who were detained last week in connection with recent bomb attacks in the Zimbabwe capital which had been blamed on South Africa. The lawyer of the third journalist expected him to be released soon.

The freed men — 36-year-old Tony Liddell, bureau chief for the London-based Worldwide Television News, and his soundman, 33-year-old Paul Hughes — told reporters that they did not want to make a statement until the third journalist, Tim Leach, was out of jail. Mr Leach is a producer for the London-based ITN [Independent Television News].

Reports said police had questioned the men about two recent explosions in Harare which the government had blamed on South Africa. [passage omitted]

Plans To Correct 'Economic Imbalances' Announced

MB281930 Johannesburg SAPA in English
1847 GMT 28 May 87

[Text] Harare, May 28, SAPA — Zimbabwe today announced sweeping measures in an all-out attempt to regain its financial poise and eliminate severe internal and external economic imbalances, the semi-official news agency ZIANA reports. The whole thrust behind the measures, which include liberalisatiion of import policies, is to attract foreign capital and, hopefully, stem ever-growing unemployment and its effects.

The government made it clear that it wanted to use the hundreds of millions of rands of blocked funds in the country for re-investment in approved projects. "We don't want people to sit on money," finance, economic planning and development minister, Dr Bernard Chidzero, told a press conference.

Admitting what he called a critical shortage of foreign exchange, he announced that with immediate effect all dividends, branch and partnership profits due to non-resident shareholders would be restricted to a remittance of 25 per cent of net after-tax profits. Until now, the practice on dividends and profit remittances allowed for external shareholders to get 50 per cent after profits.

He also announced that the present nine per cent interest ceiling on surplus or blocked funds would be reduced to five per cent with possible further progressive cuts.

By slashing remittability by half and reducing interest rates on blocked funds the government hopes to push people into using these funds for projects in Zimbabwe that hold the promise of greater returns on their cash. Dr Chidzero described such funds as "venture capital" that would have to remain invested for a minimum of five years to qualify for 50 per cent dividend rights.

He said the government hoped that local Zimbabwean investors would take the lead in this new thrust which should go a long way to rehabilitating the economy into a new growth momentum that should alleviate the present unemployment problem.

Describing the imbalances being experienced by Zimbabwe, Dr Chidzero said on the internal front the level of investment was declining while the budget deficit was high, adding to undesirable inflationary pressures. He also mentioned the adverse effects of the drought.

Externally, Zimbabwe had become a net capital exporter as repayments of foreign loans were now larger than the amount of foreign exchange coming into the country from new borrowings or foreign investment. "This development," said Dr Chidzero, "combined with inadequate growth in exports, in part due to the general weakness in international commodity prices, has resulted in a critical shortage of foreign exchange for imports and a financing gap with ramifications on the level of economic activity and a sharp rise in unemployment levels. If no remedial action is taken the economy will contract further, leading to a negative growth in gross domestic product in 1987," he said.

Zimbabwe's gross budget last year was ZD4.3-billion dollars (about R5.5 billion), with a projected deficit of just over ZD1-billion (R1.25 billion).

Dr Chidzero outlined the planned corrective measures he envisaged to rectify what he called "this untenable situation." He said the government was taking steps to encourage thrift in public sector spending and reduce the overall fiscal deficit by rationalising government operations, in particular by increasing efficiency in parastatals and where possible eliminating their government subsidies. Therefore, he said, the recommendations of the committee of inquiry into parastatals would be "speedily implemented." Measures to speed-up the decision-making process for applications in price increases had been taken, Dr Chidzero said. And the government was also looking into improving the import allocation system to ensure a speedy response and adjustment to foreign exchange requirements especially for the productive sectors.

He said the cabinet was currently examining the report of the commission it set up to examine Zimbabwe's system of taxation, important parts to which had a bearing on key issues of savings and incentives to promote both domestic and foreign investment in priority areas.